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THE RIGHT TO FAMILY LIFE AND CIVIL 
MARRIAGE UNDER INTERNATIONAL  
LAW AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION  
IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL 
Yuval Merin*
Abstract: The Article begins by analyzing the characteristics of the right to 
family life and examining various deªnitions of the “family” under 
international and Israeli law. It argues that the absence of a clear, standard 
deªnition for the “family” and the exclusion of “alternative” family bonds 
leads to an infringement of the rights of many who, in practice, conduct a 
family life. Following this discussion, the Article analyzes the degree of 
protection accorded to the family in various contexts including: the right 
of the family to social security; parent-child relations; immigration rights 
based on family ties; and the freedom to marry. The most severe limitation 
on the right to family life within Israel relates to the lack of an option to 
marry in a civil ceremony. While international law recognizes the imposi-
tion of certain limitations on the freedom to marry, the additional 
limitations on the right to marry imposed by Jewish religious law constitute 
a breach of Israel’s international commitments. The Article thus con-
cludes that the only way to guarantee equality within the family context— 
and to ensure the right of every individual to marry, free of the shackles 
of religious law, as mandated by international law—is the introduction of 
civil marriage in Israel. 
Introduction 
 International law recognizes the fact that the family plays an es-
sential and central role in human society. The family is perceived to 
be “the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled 
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to protection by society and the State.”1 This outlook lies at the foun-
dation of the broad protection granted to the family by international 
law. The right to family life, which has been recognized as a funda-
mental right in international law, is enunciated in all major interna-
tional instruments and conventions and has also been the subject of a 
comprehensive discourse in various contexts of Israeli law.2
 This Article deals with the protection of the right to family life 
under international law and its implementation in Israel on three lev-
els: protection of the family cell as a single unit (the right to establish 
a family and, in particular, the right to marry); protection of the indi-
viduals comprising the family unit (in particular, women and chil-
dren); and protection of the family in special circumstances (such as 
immigration rights). 
 Israeli family law may be divided into two parts: the laws of mar-
riage and divorce, which are governed exclusively by religious law, and 
most other aspects of family law (including maintenance, child cus-
tody, adoption, and succession), which are regulated by substantive 
                                                                                                                      
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Part 
1, art. 16(3), at 74, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights]. 
2 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 
1966, art. 23(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179 [hereinafter Covenant on Civil Rights] (reiterating 
that which is stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights); see also International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 
10(1), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 7 [hereinafter Covenant on Social Rights] (providing that “[t]he States 
Parties to the present Covenant recognize that . . . [t]he widest possible protection and assis-
tance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of 
society”). For similar sentiments, see the Declaration on Social Progress and Development, 
G.A. Res. 2542, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969) (stat-
ing that the family is “[a] basic unit of society and the natural environment for the growth 
and well-being of all its members, particularly children and youth”), and the European Social 
Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, art. 16, 529 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter European Charter]. Similar pro-
visions may be found in various regional conventions, such as: American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International 
Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human 
Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992) (Article VI: 
“Every person has the right to establish a family, the basic element of society, and to receive 
protection thereof”); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 17(1), 9 
I.L.M. 673, 680 (“The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is enti-
tled to protection by society and the state.”); Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
June 27, 1981, art. 18(1), 21 I.L.M. 58, 61 (“The family shall be the natural unit and basis of 
society. It shall be protected by the State which shall take care of its physical and moral 
health.”) .
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secular law.3 The major inconsistencies between Israeli family law and 
the provisions of international law relating to the right to family life 
are found in those areas governed by substantive religious law. Various 
international conventions that Israel has signed and ratiªed mandate 
the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, sex, na-
tional origin, race, and religion. Nevertheless, Israeli law regarding 
marriage and divorce, which is discriminatory in terms of the afore-
said categories, has not been affected by the ratiªcation of interna-
tional conventions. To a certain extent, this is because only customary 
international law automatically becomes part of Israeli law, whereas 
conventional international law, embodied by constitutive treaties, be-
comes part of Israeli law only if it is adopted or combined with Israeli 
law through legislation.4 While the Israeli government has ratiªed the 
international conventions discussed in this Article (some of which 
were ratiªed with speciªc reservations), they have not been incorpo-
rated into domestic legislation. Thus, they have no formal effect in 
the Israeli legal system and are not applied if they contradict Israeli 
law.5 The rights and duties enumerated in these conventions, there-
fore, cannot be directly invoked by individuals and do not fall under 
the jurisdiction of Israeli courts.6 This Article argues that, although 
international conventions pertaining to the right to family life have 
not been incorporated into Israeli law, the Supreme Court of Israel 
(Supreme Court) should give proper weight to the right to family life 
as a fundamental human right, and that the Israeli legislature should 
take the necessary steps to bring Israeli family law into conformity 
with the precepts of international law. 
 Part I of the Article discusses the characteristics of the right to 
family life and examines various deªnitions of the “family” under in-
ternational and Israeli law. It also examines what the right to family 
life encompasses and how it should be classiªed within the context of 
civil and political rights, on the one hand, and social and economic 
rights, on the other. It further argues that the right to family life 
should not be viewed as limited solely to one category of rights or an-
                                                                                                                      
3 See Ariel Rosen-Zvi, Family and Inheritance Law, in Introduction to the Law of Is-
rael 75, 75–76 (Amos Shapira & Keren DeWitt-Arar eds., 1995); Pinhas Shifman, Family 
Law in Israel: The Struggle Between Religious and Secular Law, 24 Isr. L. Rev. 537, 538 (1990). 
4 See Ruth Lapidoth, International Law Within the Israel Legal System, 24 Isr. L. Rev. 451, 
459 (1990); Natan Lerner, International Law and the State of Israel, in Introduction to the 
Law of Israel, supra note 3, at 383, 386–87; see also Yaffa Zilbershats, The Adoption of Inter-
national Law into Israeli Law: The Real is Ideal, 25 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 243, 245–47 (1995). 
5 See Lapidoth, supra note 4, at 459. 
6 See id.; Zilbershats, supra note 4, at 245–47. 
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other, since it has the characteristics of both a positive social right as 
well as those of a negative civil right. Part II of the Article analyzes the 
degree of protection accorded to the family in various contexts, both 
in international and Israeli law, including the right of the family to 
social security, parent-child relations, and immigration rights based 
on family ties. This Part concludes that Israel provides adequate pro-
tection regarding most of these aspects of the right to family life, ex-
cept for its discriminatory practices against Arab Israeli citizens and 
Palestinians in matters relating to immigration and family uniªcation. 
 Part III of the Article discusses the freedom to marry and argues 
that Israeli law exhibits a particular difªculty in the equal application 
of the right to family life insofar as it relates to the right to marry be-
cause the laws of marriage and divorce in Israel are governed exclu-
sively by religious law, which discriminates against various groups of 
the population (such as women, persons without a religion, and per-
sons disqualiªed for religious marriage). International law, on the 
other hand, dictates the application of the right to marriage without 
discrimination. This Part concludes that the only way to guarantee 
equality within the family context—and to ensure the right of every 
individual to marry, free of the shackles of religious law, as mandated 
by international law—is the introduction of civil marriage in Israel. 
I. Characteristics of the Right to Family Life 
A. The Right to Family Life—A Fundamental Right 
 The right to family life is a fundamental right of the highest de-
gree and has attained broad and comprehensive protection in inter-
national law. A ªrst expression of the recognition of the right to fam-
ily life as a basic human right, and of the protection of the family unit, 
may be found in Articles 12, 16, and 25 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, which state as follows: 
Article 12 
 No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with 
his privacy, family, home or correspondence. Everyone has 
the right to the protection of the law against such interfer-
ence. 
Article 16 
 1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due 
to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and 
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to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to mar-
riage, during marriage and at its dissolution. 
 2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and 
full consent of the intending spouses. 
 3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit 
of society and is entitled to protection by society and the 
State. 
Article 25 
 1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate 
for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, in-
cluding food, clothing, housing and medical care and neces-
sary social services . . . . 
 2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care 
and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wed-
lock, shall enjoy the same social protection.7
 Moreover, the right to family life is enshrined in a signiªcant 
number of international and regional conventions that emphasize the 
centrality and social importance of the family unit, and which list the 
right to family life as a fundamental right. First and foremost, the right 
is enunciated both in the Covenant on Social Rights and in the Cove-
nant on Civil Rights. Article 10(1) of the Covenant on Social Rights 
states that: 
 The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that 
. . . [t]he widest possible protection and assistance should be 
accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental 
group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and 
while it is responsible for the care and education of depend-
ent children. Marriage must be entered into with the free 
consent of the intending spouses.8
Similar protection is granted to the institution of the family under 
Articles 17 and 23 of the Covenant on Civil Rights. These provisions 
state, respectively, as follows: 
                                                                                                                      
7 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 25, at 76. 
8 Covenant on Social Rights, supra note 2, art. 10(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 7. The Covenant 
was ratiªed by Israel in 1991. 
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Article 17 
 1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful inter-
ference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, 
nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation. 
 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law 
against such interference or attacks. 
Article 23 
 1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of 
society and is entitled to protection by society and the State. 
 2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to 
marry and to found a family shall be recognized. 
 3. No marriage shall be entered into without the free and 
full consent of the intending spouses. 
 4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appro-
priate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities 
of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolu-
tion. In the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for 
the necessary protection of any children.9
 Speciªc protection for children within the family context may be 
found in the Convention on the Rights of the Child.10 Likewise, the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women includes provisions that grant comprehensive protection to 
women in the context of the family.11 Among regional conventions, 
comprehensive protection for the family institution may be found in 
                                                                                                                      
9 Covenant on Civil Rights, supra note 2, arts. 17, 23, 999 U.N.T.S. at 177, 179. The 
Covenant was ratiªed by Israel in 1991. 
10 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 16, 1577 U.N.T.S. 43, 
49 [hereinafter Convention on the Rights of the Child] (stating that “[n]o child shall be 
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation,” and that 
“[t]he child has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or at-
tacks”). The Convention was ratiªed by Israel in 1991. 
11 See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
Dec. 18, 1979, art. 16, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 20 [hereinafter Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women]. The Convention was ratiªed by Israel in 1991; see also 
Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, Feb. 20, 1957, art. 3(1), 309 U.N.T.S. 
66, 68. (stating that “[e]ach Contracting State agrees that the alien wife of one of its na-
tionals may, at her request, acquire the nationality of her husband through specially privi-
leged naturalization procedures; the grant of such nationality may be subject to such limi-
tations as may be imposed in the interests of national security or public policy”). 
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the European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms.12
 The right to family life is also recognized as a fundamental consti-
tutional right in Israeli law. The Israeli legislature has enacted various 
laws intended to encourage the family unit. For example, within the 
context of marriage, various provisions have been enacted to foster a 
caring and intimate relationship between spouses in order to sustain 
and nurture the family unit. The emotional relationship between the 
spouses is promoted, inter alia, by the following: granting a right to sick 
leave in order to care for an ill spouse;13 giving preference to the re-
quest of a foreign spouse to immigrate to, and become naturalized in, 
Israel in order to live with his or her spouse;14 the lack of competence 
of one spouse to give evidence against the other spouse;15 and visitation 
rights in prisons.16 Similarly, the Supreme Court recognizes the right to 
family life as a “particularly important” fundamental right, pointing out 
                                                                                                                      
12 See Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter The European Convention]. According to the treaty: 
Article 8 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
Id. art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230; see also id. art. 12, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232 (“Men and women of 
marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national 
laws governing the exercise of this right.”). 
13 The Sick Pay (Absence Because of a Spouse’s Sickness) Law, 1998, S.H. 234, § 1. 
14 The Nationality Law, 1952, 6 L.S.I. 50, § 7 [hereinafter Nationality Law] (providing 
that “[t]he spouse of a person who is an Israeli national or who has applied for Israeli na-
tionality . . . may obtain Israeli nationality by naturalization”); see also The Law of Return, 
1950, 4 L.S.I. 114, § 4A [hereinafter Law of Return]. In this matter, the Court has ruled 
that “an extension of the right of return to family members is intended to preserve the 
unity of the family, one member of which is Jewish.” H.C. 3648/97 Israel Stamka v. Minister 
of Interior, 53(2) P.D. 728, 755. Regarding limitations on rights of immigration and natu-
ralization in Israel, in various contexts, see infra, Part III.D. 
15 See The Evidence Ordinance (New Version), 1971, 2 L.S.I. 198, § 3 (providing that 
“in a criminal trial a spouse shall not be competent to give evidence against the other 
spouse”). 
16 See Proposed Family Visits in Prison Facilities Law, 2003, at http://www.knesset. 
gov.il/privatelaw/data/16/1013.rtf (last visited Dec. 6, 2004) [Hebrew] (“[T]he link to the 
family unit is considered a basic human need, necessary to the prisoner and his family . . . 
these needs are among the minimal civilized human conditions of every prisoner who 
belongs to a family unit.”). 
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that every individual has “a basic right to marry and to establish a fam-
ily.”17 The Supreme Court has emphasized the social importance of the 
family unit in a long series of judgments,18 adding that Israel is commit-
ted to protect the family unit under the aforementioned international 
conventions.19
 The Supreme Court has held that the right to family life—which 
encompasses the right of an individual to belong to a family unit, the 
right of a couple to marry and live together, the right to bear chil-
dren, the right of parents to raise their children and care for them, 
and the right of children to grow up with their parents—is grounded 
in the constitutional rights to privacy, self-fulªllment, and dignity and 
liberty, as enshrined in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty 
(Basic Law).20 The Supreme Court stated that “[i]n an era in which 
‘human dignity’ is a protected fundamental constitutional right, effect 
should be given to the aspiration of a person to fulªll his personal 
being, and for this reason, his desire to belong to the family unit that 
he considers himself part of should be respected.”21
 Nevertheless, although the case law has recognized the right to 
family life as a fundamental constitutional right, it has not been en-
shrined as a negative civil right in the Basic Law, nor as a positive social 
right in the Proposed Basic Law: Social Rights (Proposed Law), in its 
different versions.22 Among other things, the Proposed Law enumerates 
the right to education, the right to health, and the right to housing and 
social welfare, but surprisingly, does not include the right to family life.23
                                                                                                                      
17 See Stamka, 53(2) P.D. at 781–82; see also C.F.H. 2401/95, Nachmani v. Nachmani, 
50(4) P.D. 661, 683 (stating that “every person has the right to establish a family and to 
bear children”). 
18 See, e.g., H.C. 639/91, Efrat v. Dir. of Population Registry at Ministry of Interior, 
47(1) P.D. 749, 783 (discussing the essentiality of the family to the life of Israeli society). 
19 Stamka, 53(2) P.D. at 787. 
20 See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150. 
21 C.A. 7155/96, John Doe v. Attorney General, 51(1) P.D. 160, 175. An English trans-
lation of this judgment may be found on the ofªcial website of the Israeli Judicial Author-
ity at http://www.court.gov.il (last visited Jan. 12, 2005). 
22 See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150; Proposed Basic Law: So-
cial Rights, 1994 H.H. 326; Proposed Basic Law: Social Rights, 1994 H.H. 337; Proposed 
Basic Law: Social Rights, 2002 H.H. 214. 
23 Even if we do not read a right to family life into the Basic Law: Human Dignity and 
Liberty, and even if it will not be enshrined in the Basic Law: Social Rights, then, as a basic 
human right, it is still appropriate to examine every provision that infringes on the right to 
family life according to the standards outlined in the limitation clause of the Basic Law. See 
H.C. 5016/96, Horev v. Minister of Transportation, 51(4) P.D. 1, 41–43. An English transla-
tion of this judgment may be found on the ofªcial website of the Israeli Judicial Authority 
at http://www.court.gov.il (last visited Jan. 12, 2005). 
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B. The Deªnition and Scope of the Right to Family Life 
 The right to family life, as indicated by the provisions of the 
aforementioned international conventions, encompasses the follow-
ing: the right to marry; the right to be a parent; equality between the 
sexes within the family context; protection for children within the 
family context; and the family’s right to privacy. The right to family 
life also includes the right of individuals within the family not to be 
exposed to physical violence or verbal abuse, the right of family mem-
bers to live together in the same country (“family uniªcation”), the 
right of single-parent families and large families to receive state assis-
tance, protection for working mothers and safeguards related to preg-
nancy and childbirth, the right to beneªt from the educational and 
cultural resources of the state, the right to an adequate standard of 
living, and the right to family health services.24
 These rights are not based on a clear, standard deªnition of the 
term “family,” but rather derive from an individual examination of the 
various needs and functions of the family. Therefore, determining the 
scope of the right to family life, and identifying those persons entitled 
to beneªt from it, mainly depends on the deªnition given to the term 
“family.” It appears impossible to ªnd a single, clear, exhaustive, and 
standard deªnition for the concept of the “family,” whether in interna-
tional law, comparative law, or Israeli law. Article 10(1) of the Covenant 
on Social Rights deals with “family rights,” but does not deªne what 
constitutes a “family”25 (although, a patriarchal view of the family insti-
tution may be inferred).26 Furthermore, a meticulous search of other 
                                                                                                                      
24 See supra Part I.A. 
25 See Philip Alston, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in 
U.N. Centre for Human Rights & UNITAR, Manual on Human Rights Reporting 39 
at 57, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/91/1, U.N. Sales No. E.91.XIV.1 (1991). The member states 
that are parties to the Covenant give substance and meaning to the term “family” as ac-
cepted in each and every country. See id. In the General Comment of the Human Rights 
Committee of 1990, it was noted “that the concept of the family may differ in some re-
spects from State to State, and even from region to region within a State, and that it is 
therefore not possible to give the concept a standard deªnition.” See U.N. GAOR Hum Rts. 
Comm., Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies: General Comment 19, art. 23, 39th Sess., 1990, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1 at 
28 (1992) [hereinafter General Comment 19]. Even prior to this, the UN Human Rights 
Committee stated that the term “family” in this Covenant, as in other conventions, should 
be interpreted as including “[a]ll those comprising the family as understood in the society 
of the State party concerned.” U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., Compilation of General Com-
ments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies: General Comment 
16, art. 17, 23d Sess., 1988, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1 at 21 (1992). 
26 Despite the existence of provisions that deal with equal rights for women, see infra, 
Part IV.C, the man is the universal subject of the Covenant. See Covenant on Social Rights, 
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international conventions, decisions of various international tribunals, 
and Israeli law—as well as the law of other legal systems—demonstrates 
that a satisfactory deªnition for this concept cannot be found. The lack 
of consensus regarding the deªnition of the family is not only evident 
in the legal realm, but also, and primarily, in the ªelds of sociology and 
anthropology.27 The nature and perception of “family” change from 
place to place and from time to time, and are dependent on points of 
view as well as on social and cultural conditions.28 Historically, the fam-
ily has been deªned as a permanent, monogamous, heterosexual insti-
tution based on marriage, including a clear division of gender roles.29 
Determining who is a “family member,” who is a “spouse,” what is a 
“marriage,” and who is considered a “parent,” has long been based on 
widely accepted legal and social perceptions. Nevertheless, these per-
ceptions have been questioned—mostly in the past few decades—as a 
result of social, legal, and political changes.30
 From a sociological point of view, it is customary to draw a distinc-
tion between the traditional, extended family and the modern, nuclear 
family,31 and between both of these and the post-modern family.32 The 
traditional family and the modern family are based on ties of blood and 
marriage, and differ in regard to the degrees of relation included in 
the deªnition of the terms. The post-modern family encompasses rela-
                                                                                                                      
supra note 2, art. 11(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 7 (providing that “[t]he States Parties to the pre-
sent Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself 
and his family” (emphasis added). As such, the Covenant presumes that it is the man who 
requires an adequate standard of living for his family, an assumption based on the percep-
tion that it is the man who heads the family. Dianne Otto, “Gender Comment:” Why Does the 
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Need a General Comment on Women?, 14 
Canadian J.Women & L. 1, 19 (2002). 
27 For different and varied deªnitions of the concept of the “family” in the ªelds of so-
ciology and anthropology, see Rivka Bar-Yosef, Sociology of the Family in View of Social Changes 
and Biotechnological Innovations, 38(1) Megamot 5 (1996) [Hebrew]. 
28 See generally Nicholas Bala & Rebecca Jaremko Bromwich, Context and Inclusivity in 
Canada’s Evolving Deªnition of the Family, 16 Int’l J. L. Pol’y & Fam. 145 (2002) (arguing 
that the deªnition of family is not static). 
29 See id. at 145. 
30 See id. 
31 See Zeev W. Falk, Marriage Law 11 (1983) [Hebrew]. The accepted deªnition of 
the family in the ªeld of sociology, since the 1940s and up to this day and age, is that of 
Murdock, who deªnes the nuclear family as one that includes a married man and woman 
and their offspring. George Peter Murdock, Social Structure 1–2 (1949). But see gen-
erally Bar-Yosef, supra note 27 (arguing that Murdock’s model is incompatible with the 
characteristics of the post-modern family). 
32 For a discussion of the characteristics of the post-modern family in Israel, see gener-
ally Sylvie Fogiel-Bijaoui, Families in Israel: Familism and Post-Modernism, in Sex, Gender and 
Politics 107 (1999) [Hebrew]. 
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tions that are not based only on blood or marriage (such as unmarried 
heterosexual couples and same-sex partners), “absent” family relations 
(such as single-parent families), and the “bi-nuclear” family, where par-
ents have separated and established new nuclear families.33 While, in 
reality, there is no denying the existence of many different types of fam-
ily units, it would appear that Israeli law still essentially regards the nu-
clear family—based on a lawful marriage between a man and a woman 
who have common biological or adopted children—as the normative 
family model, and ªnds it difªcult to recognize the wide variety of 
other family models that actually exist.34
 As far as Israeli legislation is concerned, different deªnitions for 
the term “family” are found in various laws, with the scope of each 
deªnition varying depending on the purpose of the statute.35 Further-
more, since the deªnition of “family” is a functional, context-
dependent deªnition, it is even possible to ªnd different deªnitions for 
this concept within the same statute.36 Some statutes adopt a broad ap-
                                                                                                                      
33 See generally id. (noting the presence of new family units in the post-modern world). 
34 Such recognition ªnds only partial expression, mainly in the area of social rights. 
See, e.g., The Single-Parent Families Law, 1992, S.H. 147 (granting various beneªts to a 
single-parent, such as preferential admissions to day-care centers or an increased state loan 
for housing purposes). In a similar fashion, same-sex partnerships have been accorded 
limited recognition that ªnds expression in the right of a same-sex partner to receive vari-
ous employment beneªts routinely granted to partners of a different sex. See H.C. 721/94, 
El Al Israel Airlines Ltd. v. Danielowitz, 48(5) P.D. 749. An English translation of this 
judgment may be found on the ofªcial website of the Israeli Judicial Authority at http:// 
www.court.gov.il (last visited April 25, 2004). The legal conception of the nuclear family as 
the normative model up to the present day is reºected in the comments of Justice Porat in 
F.A. (Tel-Aviv) 10/99, Jane Doe v. Attorney General, Takdin (District Court) 2001(2) 125 
[hereinafter Jane Doe I]. The Justice refused to view a lesbian couple and their children as a 
family unit and to grant them second-parent adoption, ruling that “the children in ques-
tion have mothers and no one has expressed any doubt as to their ªtness to raise their 
children. Each one of the mothers chose to bring her children into the world without the 
participation of a man in her life. What is lacking for these children (if it is indeed lacking) is a 
father, but deªnitely not another mother.” Id. at ¶ 18 (emphasis added). This decision was re-
cently overturned by the Supreme Court, which allowed for second parent adoption by a 
lesbian couple. See C.A. 10280/01, Yaros-Hakak v. Attorney General (not yet published; 
decided Jan. 10, 2005); see also B. Schereschewsky, Family Law 1 (4th ed., 1993) [He-
brew] (deªning the institution of the “family” as follows: “A family for the purposes of 
family law means all those persons who are related to one another by blood or by mar-
riage.”). 
35 Initial Report by the State of Israel to the U.N. Committee on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights, Implementation of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (1998), U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.39(1), ¶ 338, avail-
able at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/E.1990.5.Add.39(1).En?OpenDocument 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Israeli Report to the U.N. Committee]. 
36 Compare, e.g., The Municipalities Ordinance (New Version), 1 L.S.I. 247, § 174A(g) 
(deªning “family relation” as “a spouse; a parent; a son or daughter and their spouses; a 
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proach, while others adopt a narrow approach.37 Examples of a broad 
deªnition for the concept of the “family” may be found in the Preven-
tion of Family Violence Law, 1991,38 and the Family Courts Law, 1995.39 
The deªnition of a “family member” in these two statutes includes, inter 
alia, a “reputed spouse” (a category akin to common law spouses) and 
a former spouse, children (including the children of a spouse), a par-
ent and the spouse of a parent, the parents of a spouse and their 
spouses, a grandfather and a grandmother, brothers and sisters, and 
brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law.40 This broad deªnition is not based 
only on marital relations and blood ties, but also on relations between 
reputed spouses and their families.41 On the other hand, there are stat-
utes that adopt a narrow deªnition of a “family member.” The narrow 
deªnition is based solely on blood ties and marital relations, and does 
not include, for example, a reputed spouse, or even the family of a 
spouse. For example, the National Insurance Law (Consolidated Ver-
sion), 1995 (National Insurance Law), provides that a “family member” 
only includes “one of the parents, a child, a grandchild, a brother or a 
sister.”42 Similarly, the Equal Opportunities in Employment Law, 1988, 
provides that a “family member” is “a spouse, a parent, a child, a grand-
child, a brother, a sister, or a spouse of any of these.”43 Further narrow 
                                                                                                                      
brother or sister and their children; a brother-in-law or sister-in-law; an uncle or aunt; a 
father-in-law or mother-in-law; a son-in-law or daughter-in-law; a grandson or granddaugh-
ter; including step-relations or adoptive relations”), with id. § 235A(a) (deªning “family 
member” as “a spouse, a child, a parent, a brother or sister, a grandson or granddaughter, 
a great-grandson or great-granddaughter”). 
37 See Israeli Report to the U.N. Committee, supra note 35, ¶¶ 338–40 (discussing 
this distinction). 
38 See The Prevention of Family Violence Law, 1991, S.H. 138, § 1; see also The Law 
Against Stalking, 2001, S.H. 1809, § 3. 
39 See The Family Courts Law, 1995, S.H. 393, § 1. 
40 See The Prevention of Family Violence Law, 1991, S.H. 138, § 1; The Family Courts 
Law, 1995, S.H. 393, § 1. The Prevention of Family Violence Law even includes uncles and 
aunts, and nieces and nephews, 1991, S.H. 138, § 1, while The Family Courts Law also in-
cludes grandchildren as “family members,” 1995, S.H. 393, § 1. In keeping with its objec-
tive, The Prevention of Family Violence Law provides a broad deªnition that even applies 
to the relationship between someone who is responsible for a minor/incapacitated person 
residing with him or her and the minor/incapacitated person. See 1991, S.H. 138, § 1. 
41 See The Prevention of Family Violence Law, 1991, S.H. 138, § 1; The Family Courts 
Law, 1995, S.H. 393, § 1. 
42 The National Insurance Law (Consolidated Version), 1995 S.H. 205, § 1; see also The 
Planning and Building Law, 1965, 19 L.S.I. 330, § 1 (containing an identical deªnition). 
43 The Equal Opportunities in Employment Law, 1988, S.H. 38, § 21(a)(1). For a simi-
lar deªnition, see The Victims of Road Accidents (Assistance to Family Members) Law, 
2002, S.H. 130 (deªning a “family member” as “a spouse, a child, a parent, a brother or a 
sister, or another family member who was dependent upon the road accident victim”). 
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deªnitions, to one degree or another, may be found in a long list of 
additional statutes.44
 In contrast to the variety of statutory deªnitions of the “family,” it 
is difªcult to ªnd an attempt to deªne this concept in Israeli case law 
or legal literature.45 It seems that the courts, as well as most legal 
scholars, assume that the deªnition of the family is obvious; in fact, 
they appear to be referring to the nuclear family. For example, in Ofri 
v. Perlman, Justice Orr held that for the purposes of the matter in 
question “there is no reason to interpret this broad term, ‘family,’ the 
meaning of which is known to all, as if it only refers to this or that 
speciªc person”.46 Nevertheless, on this subject, the Israeli courts usu-
ally follow the lead of the legislature; in other words, when it comes to 
the meaning of the term “family,” the court adopts a functional ap-
proach, taking into account the purposes of the relevant statute.47
                                                                                                                      
44 See, e.g., The National Health Insurance Law, 1994, S.H. 156, § 8(7) (deªning “fam-
ily” as “[a]n individual and his spouse and their children up to the age of 18, or an indi-
vidual and his children up to the age of 18”); The Fallen Soldiers’ Families (Pensions and 
Rehabilitation) Law, 1950, 4 L.S.I. 115, § 1; The Invalids (Pensions and Rehabilitation) 
Law (Consolidated Version), 1959, 13 L.S.I. 315, § 1; The Government Companies Law, 
1975, 29 L.S.I. 162, § 17A(b); The Penal Law, 1977, Special Volume L.S.I. 50; The Political 
Parties Law, 1992, S.H. 190, § 28F; The Crime Victims’ Rights Law, 2001, S.H. 183, § 2; see 
also Proposed Basic Law: The Family, at http://www.knesset.gov.il/privatelaw/data/16/ 
1013.rtf (last visited Jan. 12, 2005) [Hebrew] (deªning “family” as follows: “(1) married 
couples; (2) unmarried adult couples unrelated by blood who live together in the same 
home, maintain a joint household and are mutually committed to a shared life; (3) an 
adult and a minor maintaining a joint household, where the adult is the parent or legal 
guardian of the minor”). 
45 While it is extremely difªcult to ªnd a clear deªnition for the term “family” in Is-
raeli case law and legal literature, a very comprehensive discussion may be found regard-
ing the deªnition of the term “spouse,” which constitutes a basic element of the “family.” 
Opinions are divided on this subject and various questions remain unanswered, such as: 
for the purposes of family law, as well as in other legal contexts, should a common-law 
partner be included within the deªnition of the term “spouse” that appears in legislation?; 
or: is a same-sex partner also a “spouse” for the purpose of recognizing various rights ema-
nating from this status? See C.A. 2000/97, Lindorn v. Karnit—Road Accident Victims Com-
pensation Fund, 55(1) P.D. 12, 25–26; Danielowitz, 48(5) P.D. 749 at 785–86; Menashe 
Shava, The “Unmarried Wife,” 3 Iyunei Mishpat 484 (1973) [Hebrew]. 
46 C.A. 449, 464/88, Ofri v. Perlman, 45(1) P.D. 600, 609. Similarly, in most basic text-
books dealing with family law in Israel, it is impossible to ªnd a deªnition for the term. See 
generally Pinhas Shifman, 1 Family Law in Israel (2d ed., 1995) [Hebrew]; Ariel Rosen-
Zvi, Israeli Family Law: The Sacred and the Secular (1990) [Hebrew]; Menashe 
Shava, The Personal Law in Israel (4th ed., 2001) [Hebrew] (all ªnding a general 
deªnition elusive). 
47 See Israeli Report to the U.N. Committee, supra note 35, at 76, ¶ 341. 
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C. The Right to Family Life: A Social-Civil Right 
 Traditionally, international legal scholars have distinguished be-
tween the characteristics of the rights enunciated in the Covenant on 
Civil Rights and those enunciated in the Covenant on Social Rights.48 
For example, Craig Scott has proposed the distinctions listed in the 
following table:49
 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Civil and Political Rights 
Positive Negative 
Resource-Intensive Cost-Free 
Progressive Immediate 
Vague Precise 
Unmanageably Complex Manageable 
Ideologically Divisive/Political Non-Ideological/Non-Political 
Non-Justiciable Justiciable 
“Aspirations” or “Goals” “Real” or “Legal” rights 
 
 The most prevalent distinction is that found in the ªrst line of the 
table: it is customary to classify the rights enunciated in the Covenant 
on Social Rights as “positive” rights, which necessitate the intervention 
of state authorities for their implementation (such as providing mini-
mal means of subsistence), and the rights enunciated in the Covenant 
on Civil Rights as “negative” rights, which mandate state noninterfer-
ence, or an obligation to refrain from activity that may infringe on a 
right (such as freedom of expression).50 These distinctions have been 
criticized, and it has been argued that the differences between the two 
categories of rights are not at all obvious or unequivocal.51 Indeed, 
                                                                                                                      
48 See, e.g., Craig Scott, The Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: To-
wards a Partial Fusion of the International Covenants on Human Rights, 27 Osgoode Hall L.J. 
768, 833 (1989) .
49 Id. 
50 See id. For a discussion of additional distinctions between social rights and civil 
rights, including a survey of their different historical development, the hierarchy between 
them, and their different political and theoretical characteristics, see Matthew C.R. Cra-
ven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A 
Perspective on Its Development 8–9 (1995). Regarding the distinction between positive 
and negative human rights in international law, see, for example, Jack Donnelly, Inter-
national Human Rights 26 (1993); Cristina Baez et al., Multinational Enterprises and Hu-
man Rights, 8 U. Miami Int’l & Comp. L. 183, 223–24 (1999/2000). 
51 There are those who argue that, ultimately, all human rights require the state to act 
in a positive manner in order to ensure that all individuals have the opportunity to fully 
beneªt from them. See Aart Hendriks, The Right to Health: Promotion and Protection of Women’s 
Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health Under International Law: The Economic Covenant and the 
Women’s Convention, 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 1123, 1133 (1995). 
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there are political rights with characteristics found in the left column of 
the table (for example, afªrmative action) and social rights with char-
acteristics found in the right column of the table (for instance, the 
right of association and the right to strike). Furthermore, there are 
rights with characteristics in both columns of the table, their exact na-
ture varying according to the context in which they are being discussed 
(like the prohibition against discrimination).52 In this regard, even if 
we ignore the criticism and adhere to the classic distinction between 
social rights and civil rights, we would ªnd that the right to family life is 
enunciated in both the Covenant on Civil Rights and the Covenant on 
Social Rights,53 and also that this right, in its various aspects, has a 
mixed nature: both civil and social. Several aspects of the right to family 
life have more of a negative-civil nature than a positive-social nature. 
For example, the demand for recognition of the family’s right to pri-
vacy, right to marry, right to establish a family, and equal rights between 
the sexes within the context of marriage are all “legal” rights that may 
be implemented immediately, without an investment of resources, and 
                                                                                                                      
52 See, e.g., Gaile McGregor, The International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural 
Rights: Will It Get Its Day in Court?, 28 Man. L.J. 321, 334 (2002). 
53 See Covenant on Civil Rights, supra note 2, arts. 17, 23, 999 U.N.T.S. at 177, 179; Cove-
nant on Social Rights, supra note 2, art. 10, 993 U.N.T.S. at 7. It is interesting to note that the 
Covenant on Social Rights provides that “the widest possible protection and assistance should 
be accorded to the family.” Covenant on Social Rights, supra note 2, art. 10(1), 993 U.N.T.S. 
at 7. It is customary to interpret the term “protection” as an obligation on the part of the 
state to prevent interference, by third parties, with the family institution. According to this 
interpretation, then, the wording of Article 10 is narrow and only relates to the protection of 
the family in the sense of preventing interference, by certain individuals, with the right of 
other individuals to family life. See Craven, supra note 50, at 109. If that is the case, then the 
right to family life in the Covenant on Social Rights may be interpreted as a right that is 
mainly negative in character. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that, like the rest of the 
provisions in the Covenant, Article 10 is also subordinate to the general implementation 
clause, Article 2(1), which imposes positive obligations on the state. See Covenant on Social 
Rights, supra note 2, art. 2(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5. Indeed, Article 10 of the Covenant does not 
make use of the word “right,” and, therefore, prima facie, Article 2(1) does not apply to it. See 
id. This interpretation is unreasonable, and Article 2(1) should be read as also applying to 
Article 10 of the Covenant, both in view of the intention of the Covenant’s drafters to lay 
down binding legal obligations, and because it is not appropriate to interpret Article 10 in a 
different manner from the rest of the Covenant’s provisions, since Article 2(1) was designed 
to lay down the responsibility of the states regarding all provisions of the Covenant. More-
over, the Economic and Social Committee, in its guidelines for the submission of reports, 
expressly used the term “rights” when it referred to Article 10 of the Covenant. See Commit-
tee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3, The Nature of States 
Parties Obligations (Art. 2, para.1 of the Covenant), Fifth Sess., 1990, Compilation of General 
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 45, U.N. Doc. 
HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 (1994). Reporting Guidelines, UN Doc.E/1991/23, Annex IV, 97–9, UN 
ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3) (1991) [hereinafter “General Comment 3”]; Craven, supra note 50, at 
135–36. 
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which mainly entail noninterference by the state in the individual’s 
freedom of choice.54 On the other hand, other aspects of the right to 
family life have more of a positive-social nature than a negative-civil na-
ture, such as the family unit’s right to receive economic assistance and 
social welfare from the state (such as maternity insurance). Such rights 
necessitate positive intervention from the state, entailing an investment 
of resources, where both the manner and the rate of implementation 
depend on the economic capability of the state.55 In my view, it is not 
advisable to dissociate the civil characteristics from the social character-
istics of the right to family life,56 since those are different aspects of the 
same material right. Therefore, for the remainder of this Article, I will 
discuss both the “negative” and the “positive” aspects of the right to 
family life. 
II. Protection of the Right to Family Life in Various Fields— 
International and Israeli Law 
A. Protection of the Family Unit—General 
 The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(UN Committee), which serves as a supervising body for the imple-
mentation of the Covenant on Social Rights, provides clariªcations 
regarding the interpretation of various provisions in the Covenant 
(General Comments). Nevertheless, the right to family life, enunci-
ated in Article 10, has yet to be discussed by the UN Committee or 
interpreted by international judicial tribunals.57 This is one of the rea-
                                                                                                                      
54 See Hendriks, supra note 51, at 1133–34. Within the context of the right to privacy, as 
well as the right to equality, a guarantee of full enjoyment of the right necessitates the 
prior implementation of administrative safeguards, legal and otherwise, against the possi-
bility of an infringement of this right. That is to say, the state must also take “positive” steps 
in order to guarantee the existence of a right that is, primarily, “negative.”See id. 
55 See Craven, supra note 50, at 135. 
56 It may be argued that, even though the right to family life is referred to in a similar 
fashion in both the Covenant on Civil Rights and the Covenant on Social Rights, these 
should not necessarily be viewed as overlapping references, but rather as referring to dif-
ferent aspects of the right. That is to say, the right should be interpreted according to the 
context in which it appears. Therefore, to the extent that the right to family life is men-
tioned in the Covenant on Social Rights, it should be interpreted as requiring economic 
support for the family unit (i.e., its interpretation should be limited to the socio-economic 
context); and when it appears in the Covenant on Civil Rights, it should be interpreted as 
referring to the civil characteristics of the right to family life. 
57 An attempt to give substance to the right to family life may be found, primarily, in 
judgments of the European Court. For a discussion of this attempt, see infra text accom-
panying notes 69–70 and 128–32. Perhaps the lack of a special legal discussion regarding 
Article 10 of the Covenant by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
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sons why the appropriate degree of protection for the family unit, 
mandated by the Covenant on Social Rights, has not yet been clari-
ªed. In any case, with respect to those matters that the UN Committee 
does publish a General Comment, its determinations are not consid-
ered a binding interpretation.58 Therefore, the interpretation of the 
Covenant is generally left to the discretion of the individual states.59
 In Israel, as in most countries, it is customary, in principle, to 
view the family cell as an independent unit immune from state inter-
ference. In the words of the Supreme Court, this approach is 
grounded in the recognition that the family is “the most basic and 
ancient social unit in human history which was, is, and will be the 
foundation that serves and ensures the existence of human society.”60 
The Supreme Court has further held that: 
In principle, the autonomy to establish a family, to plan a 
family and to bear children is a matter of personal privacy. 
Human liberty encompasses the freedom of independent 
choice on matters of marriage, divorce, childbirth, and any 
other private matter within the sphere of personal autonomy 
. . . . The state does not interfere in this sphere except for 
reasons of special weight justiªed by the need to protect the 
right of the individual or a signiªcant public interest. . . . 
The aspiration to minimize state involvement in relations 
within the family unit, whether by direct intervention or by 
means of the legal system, emphasizes the unit’s right to 
autonomy, which is protected from interference both in the 
relations between the family unit and the state, as well as in 
the relations between the different members of the family 
unit. The situations requiring intervention are usually sensi-
tive and complex, and it is needed when a crisis in the family 
unit has occurred that calls for state intervention through 
                                                                                                                      
may be explained by the fact that the right to family life is a broad right encompassing 
numerous secondary rights that sometimes overlap other rights. See Craven, supra note 50, 
at 135. 
58 See Human Rights Committee Concludes Consideration of Initial Report of United States, 
Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1406th mtg., U.N. Doc. HR/CT/405 (1995), available at go-
pher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/uncurr/pressreleases/HR/CT/ 9503/405. 
59 Andrew Byrnes & Jane Connors, Enforcing The Human Rights of Women: A Complaint 
Procedure for the Women’s Convention?, 21 Brook. J. Int’l L. 679, 726 (1996). 
60 C.A. 488/77, John Doe v. Attorney General, 32(3) P.D. 421, 434. 
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the courts in order to obtain a resolution that the parties 
themselves have failed to achieve.61
 The tendency to minimize state intervention in family relations 
is, therefore, grounded in recognition of the privacy and autonomy of 
the family.62 For example, the Supreme Court has ruled that “the par-
ents are autonomous in reaching decisions in everything regarding 
their children—education, lifestyle, place of residence, and so forth, 
and the intervention of society and the state in these decisions is an 
exception that must be justiªed.”63 Nevertheless, there is a growing 
trend of increased state intervention into the family unit, as part of 
the democratization and individualization processes taking place in 
the modern family.64 Such intervention is considered justiªable when 
the familial environment becomes oppressive and coercive.65 For ex-
ample, the Prevention of Family Violence Law allows for the issuance 
of a protection order prohibiting a person from entering a dwelling 
where a family member resides, from being found within a certain 
distance from such a dwelling, or from harassing a family member in 
any manner and in any place.66 Furthermore, the right to family life is 
not limited to state noninterference in family life or to intervention at 
a time of crisis. It also includes the need to support the family unit for 
the purpose of its subsistence, welfare, and development, as well as a 
demand that the state identify those persons who are entitled to bene-
ªt, without discrimination, from the deªnition of “family.” 
 I will focus below on the legal protection afforded the right to 
family life, to the extent that this relates to the entire family as a single 
unit. In this context, I will discuss several speciªc rights derived from 
the right to family life, where reference to the term “family” means 
the family in all its forms: the nuclear family, the extended family, and 
even “alternative” family ties. Nevertheless, most of the legal protec-
tion and recognition is granted to the nuclear family, whether in re-
                                                                                                                      
61 C.A. 5587/93, Nachmani v. Nachmani, 49(1) P.D. 485, 499, 501. 
62 See id. 
63 C.A. 577/83, Attorney General v. Jane Doe, 38(1) P.D. 461, 468, 485 [hereinafter 
Jane Doe II]. 
64 See Fogiel-Bijaoui, supra note 32, at 109. 
65 Id. at 127. 
66 The Prevention of Family Violence Law, 1991, S.H. 138, § 2. Another example is the 
power temporarily or permanently to remove children from the custody of their parents, 
by means of an adoption order pursuant to The Adoption of Children Law, 1981, 35 L.S.I. 
360, and The Youth (Care and Supervision) Law, 1960, 14 L.S.I. 44. 
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gard to the relations between (heterosexual) spouses or the relations 
between parents and their children. 
B. The Right of the Family to Social Security and Means of Subsistence 
 Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights pro-
vides, among other things, that “[e]veryone has the right to a stan-
dard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and 
of his family . . . [and] motherhood and childhood are entitled to spe-
cial care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wed-
lock, shall enjoy the same social protection.”67 Article 11(1) of the 
Covenant on Social Rights similarly provides that 
[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the 
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for him-
self and his family, including adequate food, clothing and 
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living con-
ditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to en-
sure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect 
the essential importance of international co-operation based 
on free consent.68
Article 10(1) of this Covenant also mandates that the state accord 
protection and assistance to the family, to the widest extent possible, 
“particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the 
care and education of dependent children.”69 Sub-articles (2) and (3) 
add provisions requiring that special protection be granted to women 
and children as follows: 
(2) Special protection should be accorded to mothers dur-
ing a reasonable period before and after childbirth. During 
such period working mothers should be accorded paid leave 
or leave with adequate social security beneªts. 
(3) Special measures of protection and assistance should be 
taken on behalf of all children and young persons without any 
discrimination for reasons of parentage or other conditions. 
Children and young persons should be protected from eco-
nomic and social exploitation. Their employment in work 
harmful to their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely 
                                                                                                                      
67 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 25, at 76. 
68 Covenant on Social Rights, supra note 2, art. 11(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 7. 
69 Id. art. 10(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 7. 
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to hamper their normal development should be punishable 
by law. States should also set age limits below which the paid 
employment of child labor should be prohibited and punish-
able by law. 70
 These provisions are designed to encourage the international 
community to continuously raise the standard of living of family mem-
bers, ensure their economic well-being and social development, and 
create adequate conditions for the proper establishment and function-
ing of the family unit.71 These declarations are highly signiªcant in view 
of the tremendous resources at the disposal of the international com-
munity, on the one hand, and the great poverty suffered by many fami-
lies throughout the world, on the other.72 These provisions demon-
strate that, within the context of the economic and social rights of the 
family, special emphasis has been placed on the protection and assis-
tance that should be granted to working mothers.73 It appears that Is-
rael, primarily through its social security system, affords extensive sup-
port and protection to working mothers during pregnancy, childbirth, 
and post-childbirth care. As mandated by Article 10(2) of the Covenant 
on Social Rights, the Employment of Women Law, 1954, (Employment 
of Women Law) grants women the right (as well as the obligation) to 
take paid maternity leave for a period of 12 weeks (while providing the 
opportunity for fathers to take half of the maternity leave in lieu of the 
mother); the statute further provides that an employer cannot dismiss a 
female employee during her pregnancy, save under a permit from the 
Minister of Labor and Social Affairs.74 The National Insurance Law 
provides a series of beneªts under the heading “maternity insurance,” 
including free hospitalization for childbirth, maternity grants (and, if 
more than two children are born in a single birth, a maternity pen-
                                                                                                                      
70 Id. art. 10(2)–(3), 993 U.N.T.S. at 7. 
71 See id. 
72 Ofªce of the U.N. High Comm’r for H.R. & the Dep’t for Econ. & Soc. Af-
fairs, The Family in International and Regional Human Rights Instruments, at 7, 
U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/1999/1, U.N. Sales No. E.98.XIV.2 (1999). 
73 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, supra note 11, 
art. 11, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 18–19. The Convention deals with equal employment opportuni-
ties and is also designed to enable women to maintain their economic independence. 
Therefore, the international community recognizes that family responsibility does not 
need to adversely affect the equal opportunities of women within the context of the labor 
market. 
74 See The Employment of Women Law, 1954, 8 L.S.I. 128, §§ 6 , 9. 
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sion), maternity allowances for working mothers during their maternity 
leave, and high risk pregnancy beneªts.75
C. The Parent-Child Relationship 
 As discussed above, Article 10(3) of the Covenant on Social 
Rights provides, inter alia, that “[s]pecial measures of protection and 
assistance should be taken on behalf of all children and young per-
sons without any discrimination for reasons of parentage or other 
conditions. Children and young persons should be protected from 
economic and social exploitation.”76 Additional comprehensive safe-
guards for children, within the context of the family, may be found in 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 5 of this Conven-
tion provides that “States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, 
rights and duties of parents . . . to provide, in a manner consistent 
with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and 
guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the 
present Convention.”77 Article 18(1) further provides that: 
States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition 
of the principle that both parents have common responsibili-
ties for the upbringing and development of the child. Parents 
or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the primary re-
sponsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. 
The best interests of the child will be their basic concern.78
 Israel grants various social beneªts to families with children, in-
cluding a children’s pension from the National Insurance Institute, 
and economic assistance for single-parent families, under both the 
Single-Parent Families Law and the Assurance of Income Law, 1980.79 
Alongside the protection and assistance granted by the state to chil-
dren, within the family context, the law recognizes the right to par-
enthood—a right leading to the imposition of various duties on par-
ents vis-à-vis their children. The Supreme Court has recognized that 
“the right to parenthood is a fundamental human right to which 
                                                                                                                      
75 Regarding the history of maternity insurance in Israel, and for details about the 
level of beneªts, see Israeli Report to the U.N. Committee, supra note 35, ¶¶ 257–262. 
76 Covenant on Social Rights, supra note 2, art. 10(3), 993 U.N.T.S. at 7. 
77 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 10, art. 5, 1577 U.N.T.S. at 47. 
78 Id. art. 18(1), 1577 U.N.T.S. at 50. 
79 See The Assurance of Income Law, 1980, 35 L.S.I. 50, §§ 5 (addition 2), 12A(a)(2) 
(addition 3), 30A (addition 4); The Single-Parent Families Law, 1992, S.H. 147, §§ 2–4. 
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every individual is entitled.”80 In a similar fashion, the Supreme Court 
held that: 
The right of parents to raise and educate their children as 
they see ªt is a fundamental constitutional right, a natural 
right inherent in and stemming from the relationship be-
tween parents and their offspring. The family context does 
not stand apart from the constitutional system, but is an inte-
gral part thereof. Within the context of the family unit, par-
ents are granted rights recognized and protected by constitu-
tional law. The right of parents to have custody of their 
children and to raise them, with all this entails, is a natural 
and primary constitutional right—an expression of the natu-
ral connection between parents and their children.81
 As stated in the Israeli Report to the UN Committee on the Im-
plementation of the Covenant on Social Rights, “the basic premise of 
the Israeli law is that the primary obligation to support the members of 
a family lies with the family itself.”82 This principle is enshrined, inter 
alia, in the Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law, 1962, which states 
that parents are the natural guardians of their minor children and, as 
interpreted by the courts, have “the right to fulªll their duties” vis-à-vis 
their children.83 Those duties include fulªlling their children’s needs 
and seeing to their education, their studies, and the preservation of 
their property.84 Nevertheless, when the need arises, and in accordance 
with the primary principle of the “best interests of the child,” various 
statutes grant the state authority to intervene in order to ensure the 
welfare of a minor. For instance, the state has the power to temporarily 
or permanently remove a child from the parents’ custody by means of 
an adoption order under the Adoption of Children Law and the Youth 
Law.85 Furthermore, the Penal Law imposes criminal sanctions on par-
ents for neglecting, assaulting, or abusing their children, physically, 
emotionally, or sexually.86
                                                                                                                      
80 C.A. 451/88, John Does v. State of Israel, 44(1) P.D. 330, 337. 
81 C.A. 2266/93, John Does v. Richard Roe, 49(1) P.D. 221, 235 [hereinafterJohn Does] 
(citation omitted). 
82 Israeli Report to the U.N. Committee, supra note 35, ¶ 361. 
83 E.T. 1/81, Nagar v. Nagar, 38(1) P.D. 365, 393; John Does, 49(1) P.D. at 239–40. 
84 See Israeli Report to the U.N. Committee, supra note 35, ¶ 361. 
85 See The Youth (Care and Supervision) Law, 1960, 14 L.S.I. 44, § 3; The Adoption of 
Children Law, 1981, 35 L.S.I. 360, §§ 12–13. 
86 The “best interests of the child” principle also dictates, prima facie, that children not 
be harmed by the status or acts of their parents. Nevertheless, the application of religious 
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 Just as various restrictions are placed on the right to marriage, so 
too are various restrictions placed on the right to parenthood (in its 
positive sense). Israel grants extensive recognition to the right to par-
enthood, insofar as it relates to married heterosexual couples, and 
even provides support and assistance to married couples unable to 
bear children. For example, the Adoption of Children Law states that 
“[a]n adoption shall only be made by a man and his wife jointly.”87 
Similarly, the Surrogacy Agreements (Approval of Agreement and 
Status of the Child) Law, 1996, only allows a man and a woman who 
are a couple to beneªt from surrogacy arrangements.88 The Supreme 
Court has refused to rule that these laws are discriminatory against 
unmarried persons.89 Therefore, unmarried couples (or, in the case 
of surrogacy, those who are not reputed spouses), single persons, and 
                                                                                                                      
law in matters of personal status, which I will discuss in more detail below, also harms cer-
tain groups of children as a result of the acts or status of their parents. Thus, for example, 
according to Jewish Law, a child born to a Jewish mother and a non-Jewish father is not 
legally related to the father; likewise, a child born to a married woman by a man who is not 
her husband is considered a mamzer (this term translates to English as “bastard,” and it 
refers to the offspring of a forbidden union), something that imposes serious limitations 
on the child’s legal capacity to marry, since a mamzer is forbidden to marry a Jew and may 
only marry another mamzer or a non-Jew. See Carmel Shalev, Freedom of Contract for Marriage 
and a Shared Life, in Women’s Status in Israeli Law and Society 459–60, 465, 479 
(1995) [Hebrew]. 
87 The Adoption of Children Law, 1981, 35 L.S.I. 360, § 3. 
88 The Surrogacy Agreements (Approval of Agreement and Status of the Child) Law, 
1996, S.H. 176, § 1 [hereinafter Surrogacy Agreements Law] (deªning those entitled to 
beneªt from surrogacy arrangements as “a man and a woman who are a couple, who enter 
into a contract with a surrogate mother for the purpose of bearing a child”). For further 
discussion of the Surrogacy Agreements Law, see Rhona Schuz, The Right to Parenthood: 
Surrogacy and Frozen Embryos, in The International Survey of Family Law 237 (Andrew 
Bainham ed., 1996). 
89 See, e.g., H.C. 2458/01, New Family v. Approvals Comm. for Surrogate Motherhood 
Agreements, Ministry of Health, 57(1) P.D. 419 (holding that a single woman does not 
have a right to use the services of a surrogate mother under the Surrogacy Agreements 
Law). C.A. 1165/01, Jane Doe v. Attorney General, 57(1) P.D. 69 dealt with the question of 
whether the term “spouse” in Section 3 of the Adoption of Children Law also includes a 
common-law spouse. In the end, the question was left for further consideration, and the 
Court did not even rule that common-law spouses are entitled to jointly adopt a foreign 
child. See New Family 57(1) P.D. at 460. However, to the extent that this relates to second 
parent adoption, the Supreme Court has recently ruled that a partner of a same-sex cou-
ple has the right to adopt the biological child of the other. See Yaros-Hakak, supra note 34. 
Moreover, in H.C. 1779/99, Berner-Kadish v. Minister of Interior, 54(2) P.D. 368, the 
Court ordered the Ministry of Interior to register a lesbian couple as the dual mothers of 
the biological child of one of them, who was adopted by the other in California. A motion 
has been submitted for a further hearing of this decision, and it is pending before an ex-
panded panel of the Supreme Court. Despite the recent recognition of same-sex second-
parent adoption, unmarried couples and gay partners are still excluded from the right of 
jointly adopting an unrelated child. 
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same-sex couples may beneªt primarily from the negative aspects of 
the right to parenthood, but not from its positive aspects.90
D. Immigration Rights and “Family Uniªcation” 
 One of the areas which reºects the degree of commitment by the 
state to the right to family life is immigration policy. In this context, a 
distinction should be made between the immigration of all family 
members (usually, the migration of workers and their families from 
one state to another)91 and family uniªcation92 (i.e., the immigration 
of one spouse in order to live together with the other spouse, or the 
immigration of children/parents in order to live with or near their 
parents/children). This Article will deal with the second type of im-
migration, family uniªcation aimed at protecting the right to family 
life, in two main contexts: (1) the immigration rights of a foreign 
spouse, based on marriage; and (2) the immigration rights of foreign 
parents or children, based on the parent-child relationship. 
1. Immigration Rights Based on Marriage 
 The principle whereby the state grants immigration rights to a 
foreign spouse does not stem from a duty on the part of the state vis-à-
vis the foreigner, but rather from its obligation to recognize and en-
force the right of a citizen to enjoy the beneªts of family life in his or 
                                                                                                                      
90 While joint adoption and surrogacy are largely restricted to a man and a woman 
who are a couple—thereby discriminating against single people—single women are no 
longer discriminated against as far as artiªcial insemination services are concerned. In 
1997, the Supreme Court nulliªed a policy that discriminated against single women (in-
cluding lesbians) in terms of unrestricted access to artiªcial insemination services, and 
equated between their rights with those of married women. See H.C. 2078/96, Weitz v. 
Minister of Health, Takdin (Supreme Court) 1997(1) 939. Therefore, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in New Family to not allow a single woman to avail herself of a surrogacy 
arrangement under the Surrogacy Agreements Law, is in conºict with its previous ruling in 
Weitz. 
91 A discussion of the subject of the migration of workers with their families is beyond 
the scope of this Article. In this matter, there is a special convention that regulates the 
rights of the families of migrant workers. See International Convention on the Protection 
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, G.A. Res. 158, 45th 
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/158 (1990). 
92 In this context, I use the term “family uniªcation” in its broad sense, i.e., every case 
involving the immigration of a person so that he or she may live in the same country to-
gether with his or her family members. Further on, I will discuss the meaning of the term 
in the Israeli context and its application in the Occupied Territories and within the bor-
ders of the State of Israel. 
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her own country.93 If the foreign spouse of a citizen is not permitted 
to immigrate, then, in effect, the citizen is forced to leave the country 
in order to realize his or her right to family life. Therefore, granting 
immigration rights to the foreign spouse primarily constitutes recog-
nition of the right to family life of the spouse who is a citizen.94 The 
European Court of Human Rights (European Court) has long recog-
nized that the right to family life enshrined in Article 8 of the Euro-
pean Convention may impose positive duties on the state in the ªeld 
of immigration.95 Nevertheless, the European Court has allowed the 
state broad discretion to choose which foreigners will enter into, or be 
deported from, its territory, and greater weight is sometimes given to 
this prerogative than to the right to family life. 96
 The Supreme Court has also been asked to deliberate this issue 
in a series of cases. A comprehensive discussion regarding the discre-
tion of the state in granting citizenship to the foreign spouse of an 
Israeli national is found in Israel Stamka v. Minister of Interior, which 
considered the reasonableness of the Ministry of Interior policy re-
garding the naturalization process for a non-Jewish foreign spouse 
married to a Jewish Israeli in a “mixed marriage.”97 Under this policy, 
which had been in effect since 1995, a non-Jewish foreign spouse, who 
had married a Jewish Israeli citizen while illegally staying in Israel, was 
required to leave the country for several months during which the 
Ministry of Interior would check whether it was a ªctitious or a genu-
                                                                                                                      
93 See Goran Cvetic, Immigration Cases in Strasbourg: The Right to Family Life Under Article 8 
of the European Convention, 36 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 647, 654–55 (1987); see also Ryszard 
Cholewinski, The Protection of the Right of Economic Migrants to Family Reunion in Europe, 43 
Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 568, 589 (1994); Hugo Storey, The Right to Family Life and Immigration 
Case Law at Strasbourg, 39 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 328, 337 (1990) .
94 See Cholewinski, supra note 93, at 589; Cvetic, supra note 93, at 654–55; Storey, supra 
note 93, at 337. 
95 Courtney R. Howell, Note, The Right to Respect for Family Life in the European Court of 
Human Rights, 34 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 693, 693–94 (1995–1996). 
96 See, e.g., Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 9214/80, 9473/81, 9474/81, 7 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 471, 498 (1985) (Eur. Ct. H.R.) (ruling that the right of the couple to family life 
was not infringed, since they were married after the foreign spouse had already been stay-
ing in Britain illegally, and, under these circumstances, the state had no obligation to grant 
immigration rights to the foreign spouse). In other cases, the European Court found a 
breach of the right to family life enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention, in 
particular, when concerning foreign nationals who have lived with their families in the 
“foreign” country for most of their lives and faced deportation because of the commission 
of criminal offenses. See, e.g., Moustaquim v. Belgium, App. No. 12313/86, 13 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 802, 802 (Eur. Ct. H.R.) (1991); Beldjoudi v. France, App. No. 12083/86, 14 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 801, 801 (Eur. Ct. H.R.) (1992). 
97 See Stamka, 53(2) P.D. at 990. 
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ine marriage.98 Once the Ministry of the Interior determined that the 
marriage was authentic, the spouse would then be entitled to return 
to Israel in order to begin the naturalization process.99 The naturali-
zation process itself lasted many years and was preceded by a trial pe-
riod for permanent residence.100 The request for naturalization would 
only be discussed at the end of the trial period because marriage to 
an Israeli, in and of itself, does not grant a foreigner the right to natu-
ralization (this lengthy process applies equally to a foreign spouse le-
gally staying in Israel at the time that the marriage was performed).101 
This policy was formulated as part of the discretion granted to the 
Minister of Interior by the Entry into Israel Law, 1952, (Entry into Is-
rael Law) and the Nationality Law.102 Contrary to the wording of Sec-
tion 4A of the Law of Return, the Supreme Court ruled that, in view 
of the purpose of this statute (i.e., to avoid splitting up the families of 
mixed marriages among the Jews of the Diaspora and to encourage 
their immigration to Israel), the foreign non-Jewish spouse was not 
entitled to the rights that the Law of Return and the Nationality Law 
grant to the spouse of a Jewish immigrant (to the extent that this re-
lates to citizenship by right of return) because this arrangement is 
intended to apply to the family members of Jews prior to their immi-
gration to Israel, and not to the foreign spouse of a Jew who is a citi-
zen of Israel at the time of the wedding.103 Accordingly, it was ruled 
that Jews who are Israeli citizens could not impart a right of return to 
their non-Jewish spouses.104 In this way, the Supreme Court denied 
the foreign spouse the beneªt of acquiring citizenship by right of re-
turn, which bestows social rights such as an “absorption package,”105 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court further ruled that the Ministry of 
Interior requirement, whereby the foreign spouse had to leave the 
country until the authenticity of the marriage could be determined, 
was “incompatible with the axioms of a democratic regime bent on 
                                                                                                                      
98 Id. at 783. 
99 Id. at 783–84. 
100 Id. at 763. 
101 Id. Section 1 of the Nationality Law, which lists the different ways to acquire Israeli 
citizenship, does not count marriage to an Israeli national as one of them. See The Nation-
ality Law, 1952, 6 L.S.I. 50, § 1. 
102 See The Entry into Israel Law, 1952, 6 L.S.I. 28, §§ 1–9; The Nationality Law, 1952, 6 
L.S.I. 50, § 2. 
103 Stamka, 53(2) P.D. at 760. 
104 See id. at 764–66. 
105 See id. at 760. 
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the preservation of civil rights.”106 This policy did not meet the test of 
proportionality and was therefore null and void.107 The Supreme 
Court based its ruling on the fundamental right to family life and, 
within its context, the right to marriage, as these are recognized by 
international law: 
The Respondents did not properly weigh the individual’s 
right to marriage, and the grave harm to family life atten-
dant upon the policy that they adopted for themselves. Re-
garding the harm to a fundamental right, our colleague, Jus-
tice Dorner, has said . . . : 
 “As regards the test for selecting the means that causes the 
lesser harm, which, as stated, is not an absolute test, the selec-
tion of the means will be affected by the right that is in-
fringed. When this is a particularly important fundamental 
right, greater care will be taken in selecting the means that 
cause minimal harm, even where the cost of employing the 
means is substantial.” We should remember that the present 
case revolves around the fundamental right granted to the in-
dividual—every individual—to marry and to establish a family. 
Needless to say, this right has been recognized in interna-
tional conventions accepted by all [. . . .] Indeed, the magni-
tude of the right and the powerful radiation that shines from 
within it, would dictate, as if of themselves, that the means 
chosen by the Ministry of Interior be milder and more mod-
erate than the harsh and drastic action that it decided to take. 
And it is hard for us not to conclude that the Respondents 
completely disregarded—or gave minimal weight to—these 
fundamental rights of the individual to marry and to establish 
a family.”108
Insofar as it concerns the naturalization process, the Supreme Court 
has held that an immigrant who is a foreign spouse constitutes a spe-
cial category, and therefore, his or her right to citizenship “is superior 
to the right of others.”109 This, too, is based on the recognition of the 
fundamental right to family life.110
                                                                                                                      
106 Id. at 783. 
107 See id. at 778. 
108 Stamka, 53(2) P.D. at 781–82 (quoting HCJ 450/97 Tenufa Ltd. v. Minister of Labor 
and Welfare, P.D. 52(2) 433, 452). 
109 Id. at 790. 
110 See id. 
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 The naturalization of a spouse is regulated by Section 7 of the 
Nationality Law under the heading “Naturalization of Husband and 
Wife.”111 According to this provision, “[t]he spouse of a person who is 
an Israeli national or who has applied for Israeli nationality and meets 
or is exempt from the requirements of Section 5(a) may obtain Israeli 
nationality by naturalization even if he or she does not meet the re-
quirements of Section 5(a).”112 The main purposes of this provision, 
which allows ºexibility in the requirements for a spouse’s naturaliza-
tion, are to preserve the integrity of the family unit and avoid a dis-
parity between the nationalities of the spouses.113 Nevertheless, the 
provision does not grant the spouse of an Israeli national automatic 
citizenship on the basis of marriage, since Section 5(b) of the Nation-
ality Law—according to which naturalization is at the discretion of the 
Minister of Interior—also applies to the naturalization of a spouse.114
 As Justice Cheshin explained in Stamka: 
 Section 7 of the Nationality Law upholds international 
commitments that Israel has undertaken, and according to 
which it is obligated to facilitate the naturalization of mar-
ried women. In the language of Article 3(1) of the Conven-
tion on the Nationality of Married Women: “Each Contract-
ing State agrees that the alien wife of one of its nationals 
may, at her request, acquire the nationality of her husband 
through specially privileged naturalization procedures; the 
grant of such nationality may be subject to such limitations 
as may be imposed in the interests of national security or 
public policy.” The wording of the Convention expresses a 
will to protect the rights of women, however, considering the 
principle of equality customary in our country, it may be 
said—in principle—that this right is also granted to men. 
The purpose of the statute—in Section 7—is to protect the 
rights of the spouse, which indicates that the Minister of In-
terior must incorporate this purpose in the policy estab-
lished for implementing the provisions of Section 7.115
                                                                                                                      
111 See The Nationality Law, 1952, 6 L.S.I. 50, § 7. 
112 Id. 
113 See Stamka, 53(2) P.D. at 790; H.C. 754/83, Rankin v. Minister of Interior, 38(4) P.D. 
113, 117. 
114 See H.C. 4156/01, Dimitrov v. Minister of Interior, 56(6) P.D. 289; Rankin, 38(4) 
P.D. at 113. 
115 Stamka, 53(2) P.D. at 792. 
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 Justice Cheshin further ruled that, indeed, Section 7 of the Na-
tionality Law does not eliminate the discretion granted to the Minister 
of Interior under Section 5(b).116 Rather, Section 7 should be inter-
preted as granting special privileges based on marriage, in the sense 
that the Minister should exercise the discretion granted to him by 
Section 7, and, in worthy cases, waive any of the requirements listed in 
Section 5(a), in particular, the requirement of permanent residence 
in Israel.117 This ruling gives proper substance to Section 7, since its 
practical effect is to shorten the process by approximately six years 
and to ease signiªcantly the naturalization of a foreign spouse.118
 Thus, in Stamka, the Supreme Court nulliªed the policy of the 
Ministry of Interior whereby a foreign spouse would be deported for 
several months while the authenticity of the marriage was deter-
mined, as well as its policy of commencing naturalization application 
hearings only after the period of time required to grant the foreign 
spouse permanent resident status had elapsed. The Supreme Court 
reasoned that these policies were extremely detrimental to the fun-
damental right to marriage and family life, while expressly recogniz-
ing the state’s commitment to protect the family unit in view of the 
norms of international law.119
 Even so, it would appear that the Supreme Court does not adopt 
a uniform stance concerning the fundamental right to family life in 
the realm of immigration law. Whereas, in Stamka, the Supreme Court 
granted a superior status to the right to family life, both rhetorically 
and in the application of the right to the facts of the case, it does not 
apply this insight to other judgments, even when recognizing “the 
                                                                                                                      
116 See id. at 765. 
117 See id. at 793. It should be noted that, following this case, the Ministry of Interior 
changed its policy. See H.C. 338/99, Sabri v. Minister of Interior, Takdin (Supreme Court) 
1999(1) 154. 
118 See Stamka, 53(2) P.D. at 793. 
119 Following the decision in Stamka, the Ministry of Interior formulated a new proce-
dure, in 1999, which shortened the period of time necessary to receive citizenship. Accord-
ing to this new procedure, during the trial period, the foreign spouse must extend his or 
her temporary resident permit each year. After the trial period, the foreign spouse receives 
Israeli citizenship without the interim stage of permanent residence. In this matter, the 
Supreme Court has recently rejected a petition in which it was asked to rule that the pro-
cedure for extending the permit of a temporary resident be performed every two years, 
instead of every year. See H.C. 7139/02, Abbas-Batza v. Minister of Interior, Takdin (Su-
preme Court) 2004(1) 1266. Nevertheless, in April 2003, the new policy of Interior Minis-
ter Avraham Poraz, to grant a temporary permit of stay for two years, came into effect. See 
Mazal Mualem, A Sympathetic Ear Can Make a Legal Difference, Ha’aretz English Edition, 
Apr. 7, 2003, available at http://www.hotline.org.il/english/news/Haaretz040703.htm (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2005). 
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powerful radiation that shines” from within the right.120 This lack of 
uniformity is embodied in decisions of the Supreme Court regarding 
applications for family uniªcation (i.e., applications seeking permis-
sion from Israel to bring a non-resident spouse into the region, so to 
cohabit permanently with a resident spouse) by residents of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip.121 In Adel Ahmed Shahin v. Regional Commander of 
IDF Forces in the W. Bank, the applicants, who lived in the Occupied 
Territories, claimed that Israel’s refusal to permit women married to 
residents of the region to remain in the territories with their spouses 
was a violation of the principles of international humanitarian law.122 
The petitioners relied on Article 27 of the Geneva Convention relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949, which 
states that “Protected Persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to re-
spect for . . . their family rights.”123 Similar protection of the right to 
family life may be found in Article 46 of the Hague Regulations (IV) 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, of 1907 (Hague 
Regulations), which provides that “[f]amily honor and rights, the lives 
of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and 
practice, must be respected.”124 These two provisions require that the 
occupier protect the right to family life, but it is doubtful that they 
also mandate family uniªcation in those cases where the marriage to a 
foreign resident took place after the occupation, since the separation 
of the family requesting to be united is not necessarily a result of the 
state of war and the occupation.125
 The military government in the Occupied Territories limited the 
approval of family uniªcation requests during the 1980s, since the 
military government no longer viewed such applications as authentic 
                                                                                                                      
120 Stamka, 53(2) P.D. at 782. 
121 See, e.g., H.C. 673/86, Al Saudi v. Head of the Civil Admin. in the Gaza Strip, 41(3) 
P.D. 138; H.C. 263/85, Awad v. Commander of the Civil Admin., Ramallah District, 40(2) 
P.D. 281; H.C. 802/79, Samara v. Reg’l Commander of the W. Bank, 34(4) P.D. 1; H.C. 
209/73, Ali Odeh v. Minister of Interior, 28(1) P.D. 13; H.C. 500/72, Abu Al Tin v. Minister 
of Def., 27(1)P.D. 481. 
122 H.C. 13/86, Adel Ahmed Shahin v. Regional Commander of IDF Forces in the W. 
Bank, 41(1) P.D. 197. 
123 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
art.27, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Con-
vention]. A similar provision may be found in Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, supra note 1, at 73–74. 
124 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, Oct. 
18, 1907, art. 46, 36 Stat 2277, 2306–07, 205 C.T.S. 277, 295 [hereinafter Hague Regula-
tions]. 
125 See Yoram Dinstein, Reunion of Families in the Administered Territories, 13 Iyunei Mish-
pat 221, 227 (1988) [Hebrew]. 
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requests, but rather as “a means for immigration into the regions.”126 
In order to attack this policy, the petitioners in Shahin relied on two 
legal opinions by experts in international law. These experts argued 
that the military government’s refusal to permit family uniªcation was 
in violation of aforesaid Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
and Article 46 of the Hague Regulations.127 According to the legal 
opinion by Professor Brownlie of Oxford University, Israel is obligated 
to grant a permit of stay and permanent residence to the foreign 
spouses in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for otherwise it is harming 
the “unity of family life,” in violation of Article 27.128 Brownlie con-
cluded that this unjustiªed harm to family life constitutes a violation 
of a human rights norm that applies to Israel under customary inter-
national law.129 According to the legal opinion of Professor Shelton, 
from the University of Santa Clara, Israel is, indeed, entitled to regu-
late the entry into, and the stay of foreigners in, its territory, but this 
prerogative should not be abused and must be balanced against the 
right of the individual to marry and to establish a family.130 Shelton 
pointed out that, in certain circumstances, preventing the entry of a 
foreigner into the territory of the state constitutes a violation of the 
right to marry and to establish a family: “The right to marry and 
found a family is generally recognized in international law and has 
been applied to require permitted residence in a state of which an 
individual may not be a national. Denial of family uniªcation amounts 
to an abuse of right in such situations.”131
 The Supreme Court rejected the conclusions reached in these le-
gal opinions and ruled that both the Hague Regulations and the 
Fourth Geneva Convention “do not contain any explicit reference per-
taining to family uniªcation, in general, or to the right of foreign citi-
zens to enter a militarily occupied area.”132 Moreover, the Court ruled 
that “general principles have not been formulated that create a bind-
                                                                                                                      
126 Shahin, 41(1) P.D. at 214. 
127 See id. at 202–04. 
128 Id. at 202. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 204. 
131 Shahin, 41(1) P.D. at 204. 
132 Id. at 208. Prof. Dinstein notes that it is puzzling that neither the petitioners nor 
the Court referred to the most relevant provision of humanitarian law in this matter, i.e., 
Article 74 of the First Protocol of 1977, annexed to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
which states that “[t]he High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conºict shall facili-
tate in every possible way the reunion of families dispersed as a result of armed conºicts.” 
Indeed, Israel is not a contracting party to the Protocol; however, it has never objected to 
the aforesaid provision in Article 74. See Dinstein, supra note 125, at 227–28. 
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ing, general customary norm regarding a militarily occupied area, and 
no precedents have been established in this ªeld which serve as evi-
dence of a general practice accepted as law.”133
 Therefore, in Shahin, the Supreme Court gave very little weight, 
if any, to the right to family life as a fundamental human right 
grounded in principles of international law. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court did note that “family uniªcation is always considered an impor-
tant humanitarian matter,” but added that the treatment of these mat-
ters has always been “on the basis of ad-hoc arrangements speciªc to 
the circumstances of each case, which have varied according to the 
security and political conditions at the time.”134
 The policy of the military government regarding family uniªcation 
for residents of the Occupied Territories is similar, in one respect, to 
the Ministry of Interior policy within the borders of of Israel up to the 
Stamka decision. This similarity is reºected in the fact that the Ministry 
of Interior, like the military government, did not view the marriage to a 
foreign spouse as a genuine marriage, but rather as a ªctitious mar-
riage designed to enable the foreign spouse to legally remain in Is-
rael.135 Nevertheless, whereas the foreigner married to an Israeli na-
tional was required to leave the country for several months and was 
entitled to return to Israel afterwards and begin the naturalization 
process, the refusal to permit family uniªcation for Arab residents of 
the Occupied Territories and their foreign spouses sealed the fate of 
their applications and caused a grave and irreversible harm to their 
right to family life. In contrast to Stamka—where the Supreme Court 
ruled that each case should be judged on its own merits, and nulliªed 
the general policy of deporting the foreigner from Israel until conªrm-
ing the authenticity of the marriage—in Shahin, the Supreme Court 
ruled that an individual examination, on the merits, of each marriage-
based family uniªcation request in the Occupied Territories was not 
required.136 The military government was entitled to treat the family 
uniªcation requests as a general “phenomenon” of mass immigration 
and to implement general measures applicable to most such requests, 
in view of the “state of war” in the Occupied Territories.137 Therefore, 
in view of the “general security, political and economic implications of 
                                                                                                                      
133 Shahin, 41(1) P.D. at 210. 
134 Id. at 209. 
135 See Stamka, 53(2) P.D. at 767. 
136 Compare id. with Shahin, 41(1) P.D. at 214–15. 
137 Shahin, 41(1) P.D. at 215. 
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the phenomenon, and its consequences,” the Supreme Court approved 
the minimalist policy of the military government.138
 Regarding family uniªcation in Israel, as opposed to family 
uniªcation in the Occupied Territories, Justice Cheshin said in 
Stamka: 
Pertaining to the grant of rights to the foreign spouses, the 
parties’ counsels have used the term “family uniªcation”; 
however, this is not the correct term, and we should clarify 
this at the outset. A distinction should be made between 
“family uniªcation,” insofar as it relates to the Occupied Ter-
ritories—and in that context, this is the correct term to 
use—and the use of the term and its application to the terri-
tory of the State [of Israel]. Prima facie, these matters are 
similar in nature, since both cases relate to the desire of fam-
ily members to live together. However, despite the (partial) 
substantive identity between “family uniªcation” in the Oc-
cupied Territories and “family uniªcation” in Israel, there is 
no legal identity: the law is different, the competent author-
ity is different, the nature of the right is different. We do not 
intend to go into detail in regard to arrangements for “fam-
ily uniªcation” in the Occupied Territories. Our only inten-
tion is to state that no inference can be made from these ar-
rangements to the present case, just as no inference can be 
made from the present case to aforesaid arrangements. Each 
matter is a case unto itself.139
In this same judgment, Justice Cheshin added that: 
The State of Israel recognizes the right of the citizen to 
choose a spouse according to his wishes and to establish a 
family in Israel together with that person. Israel is committed 
to the protection of the family unit under international con-
ventions (see Article 10 of the Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, 1966, and Article 23.1 of the Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, 1966); and even though these 
conventions do not dictate any given policy in the matter of 
family uniªcation, Israel has recognized—has and does rec-
                                                                                                                      
138 See id. at 214–15. 
139 Stamka, 53(2) P.D. at 786. Regarding the use of the term “family uniªcation” by the 
Supreme Court, in the context of Jewish residents of Israel, see, for example, H.C. 758/88, 
Kandel v. Minister of Interior, 46(4) P.D. 505, 518–20. 
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ognize—its obligation to provide protection to the family unit 
also by granting permits for family uniªcation. In doing so, Is-
rael has afªliated itself with enlightened nations, those states 
that recognize—subject to reservations regarding national se-
curity, public safety and public welfare—the right of family 
members to live all together in a territory of their choosing.140
 Despite the Supreme Court’s impressive rhetoric, the basic hu-
man right to family life (“the fundamental right acquired by the indi-
vidual—every individual—to marry and to establish a family”) is in 
fact given different meanings in different contexts. While a Jewish Is-
raeli citizen has the basic right to be united with a foreign spouse, an 
Arab resident of the Occupied Territories requesting to join a foreign 
spouse is at the mercy of the military government, which generally 
denies this right because of one security reason or another. This was 
the case in 1986 (in Shahin) and remains the case up to this very day 
(the obiter dictums in Stamka). Therefore, and to the extent that it re-
lates to the Occupied Territories, “the nature of the right [to family 
life] is different.”141 Still, neither in Stamka nor in Shahin does the Su-
preme Court explain the different nature of the right to family life in 
the Occupied Territories, or, more precisely, whether, apart from a 
declarative right, the residents of the Occupied Territories are 
granted any right whatsoever to family life. It seems that the Supreme 
Court has not given proper weight to the provisions of the ªrst part of 
Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Article 46 of the 
Hague Regulations, which expressly provide that, even in a time of 
war, the right to family life of the residents of the occupied region 
must be respected (even if these provisions are not interpreted as re-
quiring family uniªcation in the manner requested by the petition-
ers).142 This approach is puzzling in view of the Supreme Court’s as-
sumption that “Israel respects the humanitarian principles in the laws 
of war and does not rely on the applicability, or lack thereof, of the 
Fourth Convention.”143
 In Shahin, the Supreme Court added that the right to family life 
enunciated at the beginning of Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention must be read together with the reservation at the end of said 
                                                                                                                      
140 Stamka, 53(2) P.D. at 787. 
141 See id. at 767. 
142 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 123, art. 27, 75 U.N.T.S. at 306; Hague 
Regulations, supra note 124, art. 46, 36 Stat. at 2306–07, 205 C.T.S. at 295. 
143 Shahin, 41(1) P.D. at 206. 
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provision, whereby “the parties to the conºict may take such measures 
of control and security in regard to protected persons as may be nec-
essary as a result of the war.”144 The question is whether this reserva-
tion justiªes the occupying state’s disregard for the rights of the resi-
dents of the occupied territory, rights enunciated at the beginning of 
the provision, especially since there must be a causal relation between 
the adoption of such measures of control and security and a state of 
war.145 In Shahin, the respondent argued that “the family uniªcation 
phenomenon . . . has become a complicated and problematic issue 
with both political and security aspects—as a means of immigration 
into the regions.”146 It is highly doubtful that this argument can justify 
a policy that automatically rejects most applications for family uniªca-
tion based on marriage to foreign nationals, except in some special 
circumstances. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court has noted in a 
different context, national security “is not a magic word and its prior-
ity does not arise in every case and under all circumstances, and it is 
not identical at all levels of security and the harm thereto.”147
 The fundamental right to marriage, as discussed below, is one of 
the most basic expressions of the right to family life; it constitutes a 
right to establish a family, unlike derivative rights of lesser impor-
tance, such as the right of adult children to receive a permit of stay in 
order to live near their parents.148 A respect for the basic human right 
to family life should lead the courts to critically examine the discre-
tion of the competent authorities and the reasonableness of their 
policies. Courts should hold, for example, that the rule of choice for 
family uniªcation requests in the Occupied Territories be the oppo-
site (whereby a hearing on the merits of each application is generally 
required,  with automatic rejection only in exceptional cases).149
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147 H.C. 4541/94, Miller v. Minister of Def., 49(4) P.D. 94, 124. 
148 Regarding this right and its restriction, see infra, Part III.D.2; see also H.C. 1689/94, 
Harari v. Minister of Interior, 51(1) P.D. 15. 
149 Israel has recently begun to apply this discriminatory policy between Jews and Ar-
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Nationality and Entry into Israel (Temporary Order) Law, 2003, the provisions of which 
were laid down as a temporary order for a period of one year. Section 2 of the statute, 
under the heading “Restriction on citizenship and residence in Israel,” provides: 
During the period in which this Law shall be in effect, notwithstanding the 
provisions of any law, including Section 7 of the Nationality Law, the Minister 
of Interior shall not grant citizenship to a resident of the region pursuant to 
the Nationality Law and shall not give a resident of the region a permit to re-
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 Even if one accepts the Supreme Court’s position—whereby, to 
the extent that it relates to the Occupied Territories, the right to fam-
ily life does not need to be examined in isolation from the security 
background—it seems that it would have been appropriate for the 
Supreme Court to set a balance between the right of Israel to prevent 
the entry of foreigners into the Occupied Territories for security rea-
sons and the right of the individual to marry and to establish a family. 
By adopting the arguments of the military government without reser-
vations, the Supreme Court freed itself of the need to balance the dif-
ferent rights. Such a balance could have been expressed, as stated 
above, by requiring the military authorities to examine individually 
each request on the merits.150 It is true that the provisions of the 
aforesaid conventions do not mandate that Israel permit the entry of 
foreigners into the Occupied Territories, just as the state has wide dis-
cretion to prevent foreigners from settling in its own territory.151 Nev-
ertheless, approval of a policy that sweepingly prohibits the immigra-
                                                                                                                      
side in Israel pursuant to the Entry into Israel Law, and the regional com-
mander shall not give such residents a permit to stay in Israel pursuant to the 
defense legislation in the region. 
Id. According to this new law, the spouses of Israeli citizens will be unable to obtain citizen-
ship, pursuant to Section 7 of the Nationality Law, on the basis of marital ties, when the 
foreign spouse is a resident of the West Bank or Gaza Strip. In this matter, the Association 
for Civil Rights has ªled a petition that is pending before the Supreme Court, H.C. 7052, 
7082/03, Ass’n for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Interior. In this petition, it has been 
claimed that the reasoning of the Ministry of Interior, which relies on the “security risk” 
ostensibly posed by the Palestinian spouses, lacks an evidentiary basis, that the decision 
stems from illegitimate considerations—including a preservation of the demographic bal-
ance and a desire to avoid the payment of pensions and welfare beneªts—and that it is 
invalid, being racist and discriminatory on the basis of national origin. There is no doubt 
that the new law severely infringes the right to family life of said couples. 
150 For a similar criticism, see Dinstein, supra note 125, at 228–29, who notes that the 
Court has displayed “excessive willingness to avoid an individual examination of the spe-
ciªc cases of family uniªcation on the ‘micro’ level,” adding that “concrete humanitarian 
problems cannot be resolved solely on the basis of general considerations.” Id. 
151 Regarding the principle whereby the state has wide discretion to prevent foreigners 
from settling in its territory, see H.C. 482/71, Clark v. Minister of Interior, 27(1) P.D. 113, 
117. 
There is nothing special or extraordinary about Israel in regard to the entry 
of foreigners and their residence in the country. Generally, every country re-
serves for itself the right to prevent foreign persons from entering its territory 
or to deport them when they are no longer wanted there, for any reason— 
and even without giving a reason. From our easy access to English and Ameri-
can legal sources, we know that, in fact, such law does exist in those countries, 
and it is well-known that this state of affairs also exists in other nations. 
Id. 
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tion of spouses into the Occupied Territories is tantamount to a dis-
regard of the provisions of international humanitarian law regarding 
the right to family life. 
 Therefore, it is no wonder that the UN Committee has recently 
censured this discriminatory practice, stating that it is “concerned 
about the practice of restrictive family reuniªcation with regard to 
Palestinians, which has been adopted for reasons of national secu-
rity.”152 As such, the UN Committee has reiterated “its recommenda-
tion [to Israel] contained in paragraph 36 of its 1998 concluding ob-
servations that, in order to ensure equality of treatment and non-
discrimination, the State party undertake a review of its re-entry and 
family reuniªcation policies for Palestinians.”153
2. Immigration Rights Based on the Parent-Child Relationship 
 With respect to the right of children to settle in Israel by virtue of 
their parents being Israeli citizens, the Nationality Law grants citizen-
ship on the basis of a family connection only to a child born in Israel 
to an Israeli citizen (or born abroad to a parent who, at the time, was 
an Israeli citizen) and to the spouse of an Israeli citizen.154 Apart from 
these categories, the law does not expand the circle of eligibility to 
other family members, such as children born to a foreign spouse 
within a previous marriage to a spouse who was not an Israeli citi-
zen.155 Harari v. Minister of Interior concerned two Burmese nationals 
who had requested permission to remain in Israel in order to live to-
gether with their mother, who was an Israeli citizen.156 The Harari 
children were 19 and 21 years old at the time that the petition was 
                                                                                                                      
152 Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Is-
rael, U.N. ESCOR, 30th Sess., para. 18, U.N. Doc.E/C.12/1/Add.90 (2003), available at http:// 
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/E.C.12.1.Add.90.En?Opendocument (last visited Jan. 12, 
2005) [hereinafter Concluding Observations]. 
153 Id. ¶ 34. 
154 See The Nationality Law, 1952, 6 L.S.I. 50, § 4(a), stating 
[T]he following shall, from the day of their birth, be Israeli nationals by birth: 
(1) a person born in Israel while his father or mother was an Israeli national; 
(2) a person born outside Israel while his father or mother was an Israeli na-
tional—(a) by return; (b) by residence in Israel; (c) by naturalization; (d) 
under paragraph (1); (e) by adoption under Section 4(b)(1). 
Id. This is different from Section 4A of the Law of Return, which expands the circle of 
eligibility for rights of “returnees” to also include other family members, such as the child 
and even the grandchild of a Jew. See The Law of Return, 1950, 4 L.S.I. 114, § 4(a). 
155 See The Nationality Law, 1952, 6 L.S.I. 50, § 4(a). 
156 See Harari, 51(1) P.D. at 17. 
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ªled and, during their stay in Israel, their father, who lived in Burma, 
had passed away.157 Accordingly, in their petition, they claimed that 
they had no other home than their mother’s home in Israel.158 The 
Ministry of Interior does not give permits for permanent residence to 
foreign adults requesting to be near Israeli family members, except 
for elderly parents of Israeli nationals who remain alone and isolated 
in their country of residence.159 The Supreme Court approved this 
policy and ruled that adult children are not entitled to permanent 
residence in Israel simply because their mother is an Israeli na-
tional.160 The Supreme Court thus rejected the petitioners’ argument 
and held that—to the extent that it concerns adult children—the Ba-
sic Law does not mandate giving extra weight to the right of a mother 
and her children to live together.161
 The issue of the right of a parent to settle in Israel by virtue of 
the fact that his or her children are Israeli nationals has been deliber-
ated more than once before the Supreme Court. In Kandel v. Minister 
of Interior, the petitioners argued, inter alia, that since their minor 
daughter was entitled to the visa of an oleh (the Hebrew term for a 
Jewish immigrant to Israel), they too were entitled to settle in the 
country on the basis of oleh status under the Law of Return, based on 
the daughter’s rights vis-à-vis the parents or the parents’ responsibili-
ties vis-à-vis the daughter as her guardians.162 The Supreme Court re-
jected this argument, holding that a minor’s right also does not en-
compass the rights of the parents: 
 A minor’s place is with his parents—where they reside, he 
shall reside, and not the reverse. A minor is dependent on 
his parents—the parents are not dependent upon him. As 
guardians, they determine his place of residence—he does 
not determine their place of residence. This category—the 
parents of a child eligible under the Law of Return—is not 
included in the group of persons eligible under Section 
4A(a).163
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 In Dimitrov v. Minister of Interior, the petitioner was a foreigner 
married to an Israeli national, with whom he had a minor daughter, 
born in Israel.164 After the couple had separated, and at the request of 
the petitioner’s wife, the Ministry of Interior decided that, at the con-
clusion of the divorce proceedings, the petitioner would be deported 
from Israel.165 The petitioner requested to continue the naturaliza-
tion process on the basis of his marriage, but the Supreme Court re-
jected this argument because of the disintegration of the marital rela-
tionship leading up to the petition.166 Another argument raised by the 
petitioner was that the Ministry of Interior was obliged to grant him 
permanent resident status, as the father of an Israeli national, under 
Section 2 of the Entry into Israel Law.167 The Ministry of Interior pol-
icy in this matter is to deny foreigners a visa for permanent residence 
in Israel, other than in exceptional cases and for special reasons.168 In 
the case in question, the Ministry of Interior had decided that there 
were no special humanitarian circumstances to justify granting a per-
mit for permanent residence, since the girl was in the custody of her 
mother, and the petitioner would be allowed to enter Israel from time 
to time in order to visit her.169 The Supreme Court rejected the peti-
tion, holding that, in principle, the nationality of the child does not 
                                                                                                                      
164 Dimitrov, supra note 114, ¶ 290. 
165 Id. ¶ 291. 
166 In this context, the Supreme Court held that from the moment the marital relation-
ship between the couple had, for all intents and purposes, broken down, there were no 
grounds for the acquisition of Israeli citizenship based on the citizenship of the Israeli 
spouse, since the rationale behind Section 7 of the Nationality Law, which allows for the fa-
cilitation of requests for naturalization on the basis of marriage, no longer existed. See id. ¶ 7. 
167 See Dimitrov, supra note 114, ¶ 293. 
168 In accordance with this policy, the Ministry of Interior grants a visa for permanent 
residence only in exceptional cases, according to the following general criteria: 
 (a)To a spouse lawfully married to an Israeli national or to a permanent 
resident of the State of Israel, who is residing in Israel. 
 (b) To an elderly and isolated parent of a national or permanent resident 
of Israel, who has no other children or spouse outside of Israel. 
 (c) To a minor child, accompanying a parent who has obtained a right of 
permanent residence or citizenship in Israel, if this parent has lawful custody 
of the minor for a period of at least two years prior to their arrival together in 
Israel. 
 (d) In exceptional cases, for humanitarian reasons or when the State of Is-
rael has a special interest in granting the permanent residence visa. 
These criteria are internal Ministry of Interior guidelines that have not been pub-
lished in ofªcial form. See A.P. 529/02, Bornea v. Minister of Interior, Takdin (Dis-
trict Court) 2003(3) 7058. 
169 Dimitrov, supra note 114, ¶ 2. 
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sufªce to grant permanent resident status to a foreign parent; only in 
exceptional cases, where special humanitarian circumstances exist, 
can a foreigner’s parenthood of a minor who is an Israeli national jus-
tify granting the parent the status of a permanent resident, but such 
circumstances did not exist in this case.170
 Bornea v. Minister of Interior involved a petition by a foreign worker 
illegally staying in Israel, whose marriage to an Israeli national had 
dissolved after a son was born to them; consequent to the breakup of 
the marriage, the Ministry of Interior decided to discontinue her 
naturalization proceedings.171 The petition raised the question of 
whether or not the naturalization proceedings of a foreign spouse 
should be terminated following the breakup of the marital relation-
ship, when a child had been born to the couple, in Israel, during the 
period of their marriage.172 In this case, as in Dimitrov, the application 
was based on the connection between the parent and the child, and 
not on the marital relationship that had dissolved and which had 
been the basis for the approval of the original application for tempo-
rary residence.173 The petitioner argued, inter alia, that the right to 
family life establishes a right for the child to a relationship with both 
parents, and that the state should allow for the existence of an appro-
priate, regular, and continuous relationship between the child and his 
parents, and should not hinder this relationship, even if one parent is 
not an Israeli national and does not have a lawful status in Israel.174 
The District Court, sitting as a court for administrative matters, inter-
preted the petition as a request to introduce a new criterion—the 
connection between a foreign parent and a child born out of a mar-
riage to a spouse with Israeli nationality—in order to prevent the 
separation of the foreign parent from the child after the marriage 
had dissolved.175 In rejecting the petition, the District Court held that 
no distinction should be made between the acquisition of a status 
based on a parental connection under the Law of Return (the Kandel 
case), and a request for permanent residence or a grant of citizenship 
based on the same connection under the Entry into Israel Law or the 
Nationality Law.176 The District Court further ruled that the legal 
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right and the duty of the parent to raise the child do not supersede 
the right of the state to bar the foreign parent from obtaining perma-
nent residence or Israeli citizenship solely on the basis of the parental 
connection. The Court stated: 
Balanced against the interest of a child’s right to live in a 
country where both of his parents reside, so that they can 
both fulªll their duties to raise him, to educate him, to nur-
ture him, and to support him, are the public interests and 
considerations of the state—national security, public safety, 
maintenance of public order, preservation of the character 
and culture of the nation, its identity, its Jewish and democ-
ratic nature, and even considerations of immigration policy 
based on economic and work force policy that will encour-
age the employment of the citizens and residents of the na-
tion, ‘importing’ foreign laborers only when there is an abso-
lute necessity.177
Therefore, in the conºict between the best interests of the child and 
Israel’s immigration policy, the District Court held that the state in-
terest is preferred. 
 Time and again, it seems that these and other state interests prevail 
over the right to family life, without the latter receiving the proper con-
sideration due to it as a fundamental constitutional right. In Bornea, the 
District Court did not properly consider the grave harm to the interests 
of the minor, the son of the petitioner, resulting from the negation of 
the petitioner’s lawful status in Israel, and which would apparently lead 
to a severance in the relationship between the petitioner’s son and his 
father. The ruling that, in the circumstances of the case, the state inter-
est superseded the best interests of the child is puzzling, particularly in 
light of the principle set forth by the Supreme Court whereby “there is 
no judicial matter regarding minors where the best interests of the mi-
nor are not the paramount concern.”178 The Supreme Court has also 
ruled that the best interests of the child dictate that he or she be edu-
cated equally by both parents and not kept away from the father or 
mother, even when they live separately.179 The District Court, therefore, 
did not properly weigh the fundamental right to family life, which es-
tablishes a child’s right to grow up with his or her father and mother, as 
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well as the right of parents to raise their children, as these rights have 
been recognized in both Israeli and international law. On more than 
one occasion, the Supreme Court has ruled that the right of parents to 
raise their children is a fundamental constitutional right: 
No one disputes that the connection of the parent to his child 
is not only a duty but that it is also a right. The nature of this 
right is that the parents—and no one else—are entitled to ful-
ªll the duties vis-à-vis the minor child. The legal right of the 
parent is that he, and nobody else, shall fulªll the duties vis-à-
vis the child. This right of the parents is an important consti-
tutional right, for it constitutes an expression of the natural 
connection—”the call of blood,” in the words of Justice 
Cheshin . . . —between parents and their children.180
Furthermore: 
It is the law of nature that a child be raised in the home of 
his father and mother: it is they who will love him, it is they 
who will nourish him, it is they who will educate him, it is 
they who will support him until he reaches adulthood. This 
is the right of a father and a mother, and this is the right of 
the minor. This right of a mother and a father has existed 
prior to statute and constitution. The law of nature is the law 
within our hearts. And even if these matters are stated in 
statute or constitution, they are none other than an echo of 
that same right from nature. Much ground water gives life to 
this right, and this is what sustains the forest of law that 
grows upon it. And the law of the land shall go in the wake 
of the law of nature.181
The family bond also establishes rights for the child: 
These rights are also based on the duties of parents vis-à-vis 
their children—as expressed in written law—regarding cus-
tody, education, preservation of property, health, etc., as well 
as rights granted to a minor by the very fact that he is a mi-
nor, i.e., rights that recognize the state of the minor and his 
limitations and special needs . . . the duties of the parents, as 
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deªned in the Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law, are no 
longer general obligations, but rather duties that establish 
collateral rights for the child. Noncompliance by parents 
with the duties they have vis-à-vis their children will be met 
with action by the state, as the entity that protects the child 
and his interests.182
In these cases, the infringement of the parent’s right to a family life 
with his or her children constitutes a grave harm, since one of the 
parents will be forced to sever himself or herself from the minor 
child. If the foreign parent is the custodial parent, then the right of 
the Israeli parent will be harmed; if the Israeli parent is the custodial 
parent, then the right of the foreign parent will be harmed. 
 These rights are also ªrmly enshrined in international law.183 Ar-
ticle 9(3) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child imposes a duty 
on the member states, inter alia, to “respect the right of the child who 
is separated from one or both parents to maintain personal relations 
and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is 
contrary to the child’s best interests.”184 In a similar fashion, Article 
10(1) provides for the child’s right to reuniªcation with his or her 
parents and obliges the member states to allow the entry of the child, 
or his or her parents, into the member country for the purpose of 
realizing this right.185 Furthermore, Article 14(2) imposes a duty on 
the member states to respect the rights of the child and the rights of 
his or her parents, and Article 18(1) requires the member states to 
“use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both 
parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and devel-
opment of the child.”186
 The European Court has ruled that the term “family life” in-
cludes the bond between parents and their minor children, a bond 
that does not cease in the event of a separation between the spouses: 
“[f]rom the moment of the child’s birth and by the very fact of it, 
there exists between him and his parents a bond amounting to ‘family 
life,’ even if the parents are not then living together.”187
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 Moreover, and despite the fact that the European Convention 
does not apply to Israel, it is noteworthy that several decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights, handed down on the basis of Arti-
cle 8 of the European Convention, the facts of which are similar to 
cases that have come before the Israeli courts. From these cases, it is 
possible to draw conclusions regarding the proper weight that should 
be given to the right to family life. Berrehab v. The Netherlands con-
cerned a Moroccan national married to a Dutch woman, whose 
daughter was born in the Netherlands.188 As in the Bornea case, the 
father had been given a permit to stay in the Netherlands based on 
his marriage. When the couple divorced, the Dutch immigration au-
thorities refused to extend the residence permit, and the father was 
subsequently deported.189 The European Court based its decision on 
the existence of a continuous and permanent bond between the fa-
ther and his daughter, ruling that the deportation violated the provi-
sions of the European Convention, and that the separation from the 
child forced on the parent constituted a violation of the “right to fam-
ily life,” as speciªed in Article 8 of the European Convention.190 In a 
similar fashion, Ciliz v. The Netherlands concerned a Turkish national 
who had received permanent status based on his marriage to a Dutch 
woman, in the Netherlands, with whom he had a child who was a 
Dutch national.191 Following the couple’s divorce, the husband’s per-
mit to stay was not extended. The petitioner argued that this decision 
prevented him from realizing his right to family life, as far as it con-
cerned the relationship with his son. The European Court accepted 
his petition and ruled, inter alia, that: 
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The essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual 
against arbitrary action by the public authorities. There may 
in addition be positive obligations inherent in effective “re-
spect” for family life . . . the instant case features both types of 
obligation: on the one hand, a positive obligation to ensure 
that family life between parents and children can continue af-
ter divorce, and, on the other, a negative obligation to refrain 
from measures which cause family ties to rupture.192
 The degree of recognition given to immigration rights based on 
family ties between parents and their children is weaker than the de-
gree of recognition accorded to the immigration rights of a foreign 
spouse based on marriage. Nevertheless, it is not at all obvious why 
the strength of the bond between a minor and his or her parent is 
weaker than the bond between spouses; it seems only proper that the 
former right be accorded protection in the same manner and to the 
same degree as the latter.193 Since the Ministry of Interior and the 
courts in Israel have determined that the marital bond mandates the 
granting of residential status in Israel to a foreign spouse who is mar-
ried to an Israeli citizen, there is no justiªcation for a policy negating 
such status when the bond is parental. In this context, Israel should 
adopt the arrangement set forth by international law, whereby, in the 
case of a separation between a couple with common children, the 
state refrains from deporting a foreign parent and grants him or her 
lawful status as part of its commitment to protecting the bond be-
tween parent and child. 
III. The Right to Civil Marriage in Israeli Law in View of 
International Law 
A. The Right to Marriage and its Limitation 
 The right—or the “freedom”—to marry and to establish a family 
is a fundamental right of the highest order that has been recognized 
as a basic human right under international law. Article 16(1) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides, inter alia, that: 
“[m]en and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, 
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a fam-
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ily.”194 Article 23(2) of the Covenant on Civil Rights states that: “[t]he 
right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a 
family shall be recognized.”195 Article 10(1) of the Covenant on Social 
Rights reiterates what is stated in Article 23(3) of the Covenant on 
Civil Rights, whereby “[m]arriage must be entered into with the free 
consent of the intending spouses.”196 A combined reading of these 
provisions reveals the centrality of the right to marriage in the context 
of the right to family life. In the spirit of these documents, Israel, like 
most western nations, also grants the highest degree of protection 
and recognition to the traditional nuclear family, which is based on 
the heterosexual married couple and their children. In this context, it 
should be stressed that the issue of the right to marry also has far-
reaching economic implications (e.g., tax beneªts, national insurance 
rights, and pension rights). The provision or preclusion of economic 
beneªts is a central means at the disposal of the state to direct indi-
viduals towards existing family models preferred by society. By grant-
ing a preferential status to the institution of marriage over other types 
of partnerships, the state expresses its position that the heterosexual 
marriage embodies the normative family unit deserving of various 
state beneªts. Nevertheless, even within this narrow framework, the 
state imposes various limitations on the right to marry. 
 In most western countries, as in Israel, several explicit limitations 
on the right to marry are accepted as a matter of public policy. Three 
such limitations relate to the following: a minimum age for marriage, 
family relations between the spouses (a prohibition against incestuous 
marriages on grounds of both consanguinity and afªnity), and the 
existence of a previous marriage (a prohibition of bigamy and polyg-
amy). An additional prohibition relates to the sex of the spouses, (i.e., 
a prohibition of marriage between same-sex partners).197
1. Minimum Age for Marriage 
 Even though the speciªc age varies from country to country, a 
limitation on the age for marriage is accepted in most western nations 
and is based, inter alia, on the notion that “the creation of a family 
unit with a formal, binding relationship requires personal maturity, 
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and, in a civilized society, one waits for the development of the per-
sonality—i.e., attributes of mind and body—before permitting mar-
riage.”198 This limitation ªnds expression both in Article 16(1) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that “[m]en 
and women of full age . . . have the right to marry and to found a fam-
ily” (emphasis added),199 and in Article 23(2) of the Covenant on 
Civil Rights, which states that the right to marry shall be granted to 
“men and women of marriageable age.”200 In a similar fashion, Article 
16(2) of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women provides that “all necessary action, including legislation, shall 
be taken to specify a minimum age for marriage and to make the reg-
istration of marriages in an ofªcial registry compulsory.”201 The ra-
tionale behind these provisions is that the free consent of the marry-
ing couple is a prerequisite for marriage, and that it is necessary to 
establish a minimum age in order to ensure that this consent is, in 
fact, given freely.202 Another reason is the need to guarantee stable 
married life and the view that such stability can only be guaranteed if 
the two spouses are mature enough to be fully aware of their obliga-
tions within the family context.203 The aforesaid conventions do not 
specify the minimum age required, with the understanding that each 
state will give substance to its obligation to set a minimum age for 
marriage in accordance with the accepted values of its own society.204
 The principle of a minimum age for marriage is also enshrined 
in the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Mar-
riage and Registration of Marriages, a special international conven-
tion which Israel has signed.205 This Convention reiterates the princi-
ple expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
states, in Article 2, that: 
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States Parties to the present Convention shall take legislative 
action to specify a minimum age for marriage. No marriage 
shall be legally entered into by any person under this age, 
except where a competent authority has granted a dispensa-
tion as to age, for serious reasons, in the interest of the in-
tending spouses.206
 In Israel, this matter is regulated by the Marriage Age Law, 1950 
(Marriage Age Law). Until 1998, this statute speciªed the age of sev-
enteen as the minimum age of marriage for women.207 For men, how-
ever, no minimum age of marriage was speciªed.208 In order to ad-
dress this disparity, the statute was amended so that its provisions 
limiting the marriage of young girls were applied equally to the mar-
riage of young boys under the age of seventeen, out of the under-
standing that “the prevention of underage marriages is necessary for 
young boys to the same extent that it is required for young girls.”209 
According to the amended statute, the performance of a marriage 
ceremony for a young boy or girl under the age of seventeen consti-
tutes a criminal offense punishable by two years imprisonment.210 The 
statute does not annul the validity of underage marriages, but rather 
imposes criminal sanctions on the man or woman who marries the 
young girl or boy, on those persons who perform the ceremony, and 
on anyone who assists them.211 Nevertheless, Section 5 of the Mar-
riage Age Law speciªes two alternative grounds for a court to permit 
an underage marriage. The ªrst case arises when a young girl has be-
come pregnant by, or has given birth to the child of, the person she is 
asking to marry, or when a young boy wants to marry a woman who 
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has become pregnant with, or has given birth to, his child.212 The sec-
ond case, also applicable to both the marriage of a young boy and the 
marriage of a young girl, arises when the girl or boy has reached the 
age of sixteen and, in the court’s opinion, there are special circum-
stances that justify granting such permission. The statute does not 
specify, however, exactly what these “special circumstances” are.213 
The Israeli Report to the UN Committee regarding the implementa-
tion of the Covenant on Social Rights indicates that, while the per-
centage of marriages between young girls under the age of 17 and 
adult men averaged about 48% between the years 1975–1979, by 1993 
this number stood at about 10%.214 Nevertheless, the marriage of mi-
nors in Israel is still an ongoing phenomenon—albeit, on the de-
cline—in spite of the Marriage Age Law and the criminal sanctions 
imposed therein.215
2. Prohibition Against Incestuous Marriages on Grounds of 
Consanguinity and Afªnity 
 Regarding the prohibition of marriage between persons related 
by blood or marriage, it is the applicable religious law that speciªes 
the degrees of relation included in the prohibition.216 Nevertheless, 
the prohibition is not limited to religious law and should not be 
viewed only as a religious norm; it is accepted in all civilized societies 
and has rational justiªcations that sufªce on their own.217 For in-
stance, one of the explanations for this prohibition is based on genet-
ics and the fear that children born to people who are related by blood 
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are liable to be afºicted with various genetic defects.218 Of course, the 
genetic fear does not justify prohibitions based on relations by mar-
riage and, in this matter, it seems that the rationale stems from psy-
chological and sociological considerations.219
3. Prohibition of Bigamy 
 The prohibition against multiple marriages is designed to uproot 
customs accepted in traditional societies that harm the status of 
women.220 If we accept the deªnition of marriage as a permanent, ex-
clusive relationship between two spouses, not only does this restriction 
do no harm to the right to family life, but it even reinforces the right.221 
Section 176 of the Penal Law speciªes bigamy as a criminal offense, 
whereby: “[a] married man who marries another woman, or a married 
woman who marries another man, is liable to imprisonment for ªve 
years.”222 Since matters of marriage and divorce in Israel are governed 
by religious law, the legislature cannot declare bigamous marriages void 
when such marriages are recognized by the relevant religious law (such 
as in a case where permission has been granted by a Rabbinical Court 
for the second marriage of a Jewish man).223 Nevertheless, the legisla-
ture does take steps to eliminate the phenomenon by means of crimi-
nal sanctions.224 Accordingly, Section 179 of the Penal Law states that 
the criminal prohibition does not apply to the second marriage of a 
Jewish man who has received permission to remarry from a Rabbinical 
Court (an option not available to a woman, who is an agunah, or 
“chained woman,” who, in Jewish Law, is bound in marriage by a hus-
band who refuses to grant a divorce or is missing and not proved dead). 
Regarding persons who are not Jewish, Section 180 of the Penal Law 
provides that a second marriage shall not be deemed a violation of the 
prohibition of bigamy if the spouse by the earlier marriage is mentally 
ill or has been missing for a period of seven years under circumstances 
raising a reasonable presumption of death.225
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4. Prohibition of Marriage Between Same-Sex Partners 
 Until recently, the institution of marriage had been deªned and 
perceived as being limited to the relationship between a man and a 
woman, without any need for explicit legislation prohibiting same-sex 
marriages. In the past, it was even argued that this was not to be 
viewed as a restriction on the freedom to marry, since, by its very 
deªnition, marriage was limited to partners of different sexes.226 So 
far, the only countries that have recognized same-sex marriages are 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada (in Ontario, British Columbia, and 
Quebec), and one U.S. state (Massachusetts), and in other countries 
throughout the world there is an ongoing legal and public struggle 
for such recognition.227 Many countries recognize same-sex couples as 
a family and, in differing measures, extend various provisions to them 
that apply to married couples.228 The right to family life is not the ex-
clusive domain of heterosexual society. Many gays and lesbians con-
duct a family life for all intents and purposes. Alongside the limited 
recognition granted by the Israeli Supreme Court to same-sex part-
nerships and the right to parenthood of gays and lesbians,229 the case 
law of the Family Court and the District Court negates such recogni-
tion.230 While restrictions as to the age for marriage, polygamous mar-
riages, and marriages between relatives are rational and desirable, the 
restriction of marriage to heterosexual partnerships is unjustiªed and 
results from prejudice against gays and lesbians.231 Nevertheless, it 
seems that as long as religious law exclusively governs matters of mar-
riage and divorce in Israel, the legislature cannot be expected to rec-
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ognize the rights of gays and lesbians to marry. If and when, however, 
the barriers to civil marriage are removed, as mandated by the inter-
national conventions that Israel has signed, then their restriction to 
heterosexual relationships may be considered illegitimate discrimina-
tion that violates the principle of equality. 
 In addition to the ªrst three limitations on the right to marriage 
discussed above (a minimum age, the prohibition of the marriage of 
relatives, and the prohibition of bigamy)—restrictions which are ac-
cepted in all western nations and perceived of as legitimate in all civi-
lized societies, and which are not to be viewed of as religious coer-
cion—there are several additional limitations on the right to marry 
that are speciªc to Israel. Not only is the right to marriage not applied 
equally to all residents of the country, but there is also an inherent 
discrimination between men and women in the laws of marriage and 
divorce in Israel. These limitations stem from the application of reli-
gious law to matters of marriage and divorce and from the lack of civil 
marriage. In contrast to the Israeli legal situation, in most Western 
nations, the transition from religious law to the regulation of mar-
riage as a secular civil right had begun in the 18th and 19th centuries 
with the end of the Church’s monopolistic jurisdiction and the intro-
duction of civil marriage.232 Israel is one of the only democratic coun-
tries in the world where personal law is still exclusively governed by 
religious law.233 Section 2 of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Mar-
riage and Divorce) Law, 1953, (Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law) 
provides that: “Marriages and divorces of Jews shall be performed in 
Israel in accordance with Jewish religious law.”234 The application of 
religious law to matters of marriage and divorce for Jews in Israel, and 
the lack of an option to marry in a civil marriage ceremony, consti-
tutes a serious infringement of the right to family life, in general, and 
of the right to marriage, in particular. This infringement is further 
aggravated by the exclusive jurisdiction of the religious courts in mat-
ters of marriage and divorce—institutions that completely exclude 
women. The absence of an option for civil marriage harms three 
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main groups. First and foremost, the application of religious law to 
matters of marriage and divorce constitutes a violation of the princi-
ple of equality between the sexes, since many religious laws discrimi-
nate against women. Second, the lack of a civil arrangement for mar-
riage also harms those persons who are unable to marry according to 
religious law (such as those persons who have no religion). Third, the 
religious monopoly also harms the freedom from religion of all those 
couples who do not want religious law to apply to their marriages. 
B. The Laws of Marriage and Divorce in Israel: Discrimination Against 
Women and Additional Groups 
1. Discrimination Against Women 
 Religious law—all religious law—is based on a patriarchal view-
point and tradition,235 and, as such, discriminates against women. 
This discrimination is apparent, inter alia, in the subordination of 
women to the authority of men, in an unequal division of roles within 
the family, and in the perception that women possess a very limited 
social and personal status.236 Moreover, for Jews in Israel, the religious 
law that governs in matters of personal status is the law as interpreted 
by Orthodox Judaism, which leaves no room for a more lenient inter-
pretation that is inclined to greater equality between the sexes, such 
as that of the Conservative or Reform Movements.237
 To the extent that it relates to the inequality between the sexes 
within the context of the laws of marriage and divorce, the Women’s 
Equal Rights Law, 1951, has merely declarative signiªcance. The pur-
pose of this statute is “to lay down principles for the guarantee of full 
equality between men and women,”238 and, indeed, the statute pro-
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vides that “one law shall apply to men and women regarding any legal 
act; and any statutory provision that discriminates against a woman, as 
a woman, regarding any legal act, shall not be binding”.239 Neverthe-
less, the reservation in Section 5, whereby the statute “shall not affect 
any legal prohibition or permission relating to marriage or divorce,” 
in effect, renders it meaningless and actually reinforces the discrimi-
nation against women prevailing in religious law.240
 The laws of marriage and divorce regulate three different areas: 
(1) the manner of entering into a marriage, from the perspective of 
form and capacity; (2) the system of rights and duties constituting the 
substance of a marriage; and (3) the manner in which a marriage is 
dissolved.241 In all three areas, provisions of Jewish religious law are dis-
criminatory against women.242 It sufªces to give several examples from 
the ªeld of divorce law applying to Jews in Israel, although similar prob-
lems also exist according to the religious law applying to other popula-
tion groups in Israel (Christians, Muslims, and so forth). Discrimina-
tion against women in divorce law is expressed, primarily, in the fact 
that the grounds for divorce available to them are different and fewer 
than those available to men. A ground of action sufªcient to obligate a 
wife to accept a get (the writ of divorce), does not necessarily sufªce to 
force the husband to deliver a get.243 This results in an asymmetry be-
tween the husband and the wife in the grounds for obligating and 
compelling the delivery of a get, something that acts to the detriment of 
the wife.244 It should be further noted that the Rabbinical Courts are 
                                                                                                                      
239 Id. § 1(A)(a). 
240 Id. § 5. For a discussion of Section 5 of the statute and the background to its en-
actment, see H.C. 49/54, Melcham v. Sharia Judge, Aco Region, 8 P.D., 910, 916. Moreover, 
despite the fact that Section 8(b) of the statute provides that it is forbidden to dissolve a 
marriage against the will of the wife, this provision only applies in the absence of a judg-
ment by a competent court. Therefore, if the precepts of religious law allow it, there is 
nothing in this provision to protect the woman. See Amnon Rubinstein & Barak Medina, 
1 Constitutional Law in the State of Israel 316 (5th ed., 1997) [Hebrew]. 
241 Shalev, supra note 86, at 459–60. 
242 Both marriage and divorce are, essentially, legal acts performed by the man, and 
not by the woman. The woman plays a passive role and is silent both during the marriage 
ceremony (in which the husband “purchases” the wife) and in the divorce ceremony (the 
consent of the husband is a condition without which there is no divorce). See Rubinstein 
& Medina, supra note 240, at 316; Shalev, supra note 86, at 461. The wife owes the husband 
“her work”: household chores, care of the husband and the children, and additional work 
limited to the home. See Shalev, supra note 86, at 461; see also Shahar Lifshitz, A Civil 
Reorientation in Israeli Family Law 7 (2002); Rosen-Zvi, supra note 46, at 225–28. 
243 Rosen-Zvi, supra note 46, at 138–39. 
244 See Rosen-Zvi, supra note 46, at 138–39. 
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very reluctant to coerce a husband to deliver a get.245 Likewise, without 
having received a get from her husband, a woman is unable to obtain 
permission to remarry, whereas, in contrast, a husband is entitled to 
remarry by special permission of the Rabbinical Court.246
 The UN Committee has censured this discriminatory practice, 
stating that: 
The Committee expresses concern about the fact that the 
Jewish religious courts’ interpretation of personal status law 
with respect to divorce is discriminatory as regards women, 
especially the regulation that allows the husband to remarry 
even when the wife is opposed to the divorce, whilst the 
same rules do not apply to the wife. . . . The Committee rec-
ommends that the State party take steps to modify the Jewish 
religious courts’ interpretation of the law concerning di-
vorce to ensure equality between men and women, as pro-
vided for in article 3 of the Covenant.247
 Therefore, in contrast to men, women are sentenced to monog-
amy, since, according to Jewish Law, adultery is only forbidden to 
women (in the sense that a married woman, who has not received a 
get from her husband, is considered an adulteress if she has relations 
with another man). This monogamy is imposed upon her all the more 
forcefully by the rule providing that any child born to her from a man 
who is not her husband will be considered a mamzer (the offspring of a 
forbidden union).248 Therefore, frequently the option of a life as the 
reputed spouse of another man is also closed off to her, if she has not 
received a get from her husband. In contrast, the husband is not ex-
posed to any sanction if he lives with another woman as his reputed 
spouse.249 Moreover, the relative bargaining power of the wife is infe-
rior to that of the husband.250 The problem of aginut (the wife’s status 
as an agunah) leads to a situation in which the woman is sometimes 
willing to make signiªcant economic concessions in order to be re-
leased from an extortionist spouse.251 Matters are further complicated 
                                                                                                                      
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 Concluding Observations, supra note 151, ¶¶ 23, 39. 
248 Schereschewsky, supra note 34, at 59, 346. 
249 Rosen-Zvi, supra note 46, at 137. 
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251 Another practice that may lead to the aginut of the wife, and which may serve as an 
opening for extortion on the part of others, is the religious rule whereby the rite of chalit-
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by what is known as the “jurisdictional race,” i.e., the race between the 
spouses to ªle suit ªrst, in the instance he or she prefers, either the 
religious court or the Family Court (generally, women prefer the Fam-
ily Courts, while men prefer the Rabbinical Courts).252 This race is 
detrimental to the bargaining power of the parties, especially that of 
the economically weaker party which, in most cases, is the wife.253
 The property arrangements between the spouses prior to the di-
vorce reºect further discrimination. On the subject of maintenance, 
despite the fact that the law applying in both the religious court and 
the Family Court is the same law—the personal law of the parties254— 
studies by the National Insurance Institute indicate that the level of 
maintenance payments in judgments by the Rabbinical Courts is thirty 
percent lower than that in those handed down by the civil courts.255
 The situation is no better concerning the division of property 
between separating spouses who have not made a property agree-
ment. According to the resources-balancing arrangement laid down 
in the Spouses (Property Relations) Law, 1973, resources balancing 
only takes place upon the dissolution of the marriage as a result of a 
divorce or the death of one spouse.256 This arrangement leads to a 
problematic situation, potentially more harmful to women than to 
men, because women who are denied a get are unable to beneªt from 
a resources-balancing arrangement, even when the marriage has been 
effectively over for many years.257 The later the resources balancing 
takes place, the greater the bargaining power of the husband.258
                                                                                                                      
zah is required in a case of yibbum (for an explanation of these terms, see infra note 264). 
For a discussion of this subject, see Rosen-Zvi, supra note 46, at 252. 
252 Rosen-Zvi, supra note 46, at 142. 
253 Id. Recently, Judge Granit of the Tel Aviv Family Court has relied on the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women as an interpretive tool to justify 
nullifying the “jurisdictional race” and to grant the Family Court parallel jurisdiction to 
that of the Rabbinical Court, even when the husband has ªrst ªled suit for divorce in the 
Rabbinical Court and included (a good faith inclusion) the matter of maintenance pay-
ments. See Misc. Civ. Appl. (Tel Aviv) 10408/01, L.S. v. L.A., Takdin (Family Court) 2003(1) 
126. 
254 See generally The Family Law Amendment (Maintenance) Law, 1959, 13 L.S.I. 73 
(dictating the applicable law for maintenance disputes). 
255 Sivan, supra note 237, at 17. For an analysis of the inferior economic status of 
women in the Israeli social reality and a discussion of the implications of this situation on 
their weaker bargaining power within the context of divorce negotiations, see Rosen-Zvi, 
supra note 46, at 144–58. 
256 The Spouses (Property Relations) Law, 1973, 27 L.S.I. 313, § 5. 
257 See id. 
258 Rosen-Zvi, supra note 46, at 156–57; Sivan, supra note 237, at 19–21. 
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2. Discrimination Against Additional Groups 
 In addition to the discrimination against women, the application 
of religious law in matters of marriage and divorce also discriminates 
against several other groups. The exclusive application of religious law 
leads to a situation in which persons belonging to these groups are 
completely unable to get married in Israel. The groups that are 
harmed include, ªrst of all, those persons without a religion and 
those persons whose religious community is not recognized.259 Sec-
ond, Israeli law does not permit mixed marriages, i.e., marriages be-
tween members of different religious communities (except for those 
isolated cases in which the personal law of both parties recognizes 
such marriages).260 Under Jewish Law, a marriage between a Jew and 
a non-Jew is void ab initio.261 The third group includes persons dis-
qualiªed for religious marriage. Even when both spouses are Jewish, 
there are various prohibitions in religious law that limit their right to 
marry. Such couples are “disqualiªed for marriage” because they are 
unable to marry according to the laws of Israel. The impediments to 
marriage may be classiªed into three categories, according to their 
consequences:262 (1) marriages that are void ab initio including, inter 
alia, the second marriage of a woman still considered to be married to 
her previous husband and incestuous relationships;263 (2) doubtful 
marriages in which there is a question as to the validity of the mar-
riage(which may arise, for example, in a case of a private marriage or 
a civil marriage that has been performed abroad), and where, be-
                                                                                                                      
259 This is the case, for instance, regarding members of the Protestant faith and the 
Karaite community. This also means that even a Jew who belongs to the Reform Movement 
cannot be married in Israel in a Reform ceremony that will be recognized by state authori-
ties. See Shifman, supra note 237, at 13. 
260 Rubinstein, supra note 217, at 440. 
261 Shalev, supra note 86, at 472. Nevertheless, the secular legislature has provided for a 
way to dissolve mixed marriages in the Matters of Dissolution of Marriage ( Jurisdiction in 
Special Cases) Law, 1969, 23 L.S.I. 274. This statute also applies to those persons without a 
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cal. See Rubinstein & Medina, supra note 240, at 300; Menashe Shava, Rules of Jurisdiction 
and Conºict of Law in Matters of Dissolution of Marriage, 1 Iyunei Mishpat 125, 141–42 
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262 See Shalev, supra note 86, at 476. 
263 See Shifman, supra note 46, at 199. A child born in consequence of such relations is 
considered a mamzer, who is forbidden to marry another Jew and is only permitted to 
marry another mamzer or a non-Jew. See Shalev, supra note 86, at 479. 
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cause of this doubt, the wife requires a get in order to remarry;264 and 
(3) prohibited marriages that are retroactively valid—this category 
(which results in the couple being forced to divorce one another) in-
cludes, inter alia, the prohibition against the marriage of a Kohen (a 
descendant of the ancient priestly caste) to a divorced woman, to a 
chalutzah (a widow released from a levirate marriage), or to a con-
vert.265 These groups include about a quarter of a million immigrants 
from the CIS (the former Soviet Union) and many Ethiopian immi-
grants who are not Jewish, or whose Jewishness is questioned by the 
religious establishment.266 They, too, are unable to realize their right 
to marry and to establish a family in Israel.267
 These restrictions are just an example of the many limitations 
imposed by religious law, in general, and by Jewish Law, in particular. 
These and other restrictions cause grave harm to the freedom of the 
couple to marry and to establish a family. The solutions that exist in 
order to circumvent these prohibitions are limited and partial.268
 In addition to the discrimination against women and other 
groups that results from the restrictions imposed by religious law, its 
application in matters of marriage and divorce also does harm to the 
freedom of those Israeli citizens who do not want religious law to gov-
ern their personal status. The imposition of religious restrictions that 
entail the jurisdiction of Rabbinical Courts and the application of re-
ligious law in matters of marriage and divorce is incompatible with 
                                                                                                                      
264 See Shalev, supra note 86, at 477. A doubt also arises in the case of a childless widow 
who has married without the rite of chalitzah. The rules of yibbum (levirate marriage) and 
chalitzah are a further example of how religious law is more prejudicial to women than it is 
to men. Under these rules, when the husband dies childless and is survived by a brother, 
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the widow is forbidden from marrying another man. Even though regulations by the Is-
raeli Rabbinate have ruled that the yibbum is forbidden (i.e., that the brother may not 
marry the widow), they still require the rite of chalitzah in order that the wife may remarry. 
This obligation makes the wife dependent upon the goodwill of her husband’s brother. See 
id. 
265 For additional prohibitions included in this category, see Schereschewsky, supra 
note 34, at 56–60. 
266 Joseph Algazy, A Marriage of Inconvenience, Ha’aretz English Edition, Jan. 21, 
2002, available at http://www.interfaithfamily.com/article/issue81/algazy.phtml (last vis-
ited Jan. 12, 2005). 
267 See id. 
268 The mechanisms that enable, to one extent or another, the circumvention of reli-
gious law in matters of marriage and divorce, include marriage outside of Israel, private 
marriage ceremonies, a shared life as reputed spouses, and marital agreements. See Rubin-
stein, supra note 217, at 443–49. 
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freedom of conscience and freedom from religion.269 Freedom of 
conscience and religion dictate that the individual has the legal and 
practical option to realize his or her rights—including the right to 
marriage—without being compelled to rely on religious norms, reli-
gious ceremonies, and religious authorities.270
C. The Freedom to Marry without Discrimination—International Law 
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenant on 
Civil Rights, and the Covenant on Social Rights all recognize the right 
to marry as a fundamental right.271 Moreover, these three instruments 
lay down the principle of equality of rights between the sexes within 
the context of the institution of marriage, in the three areas discussed 
above: the creation of the marriage, the duties and rights during mar-
ried life, and the dissolution of the marriage. The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights provides, at the end of Article 16(1), that the 
spouses “are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage 
and at its dissolution.”272 The Covenant on Civil Rights also provides 
for equality of rights within the context of marriage. According to Ar-
ticle 23(4), “States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appro-
priate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses 
as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.”273 In the Cove-
nant on Social Rights, the requirement of equality of rights between 
the spouses arises both from Article 2(2), which provides that the 
rights enunciated in the Covenant be exercised without discrimina-
tion of any kind, including discrimination on the basis of sex, and 
from Article 3, which states the principle of equality between the sexes 
as follows: “[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to 
ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all 
economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present Cove-
                                                                                                                      
269 Justice Landau in H.C. 80/63, Gurªnkel v. Minister of Interior, 17(3) P.D. 2048; 
Justice Berenson in H.C. 287/69, Miron v. Minister of Labor, 24(1) P.D. 337, 363. A discus-
sion of the degree of harm to freedom from religion in the application of religious law in 
matters of marriage and divorce in Israel is beyond the scope of this article. Regarding this 
matter, see Rubinstein & Medina, supra note 240, at 190–95; Shifman, supra note 237, at 
7–19. 
270 Rubinstein & Medina, supra note 240, at 193; see also Basheva E. Genut, Note, Com-
peting Visions of the Jewish State: Promoting and Protecting Freedom of Religion in Israel, 19 Ford-
ham Int’l L.J. 2120 (1996). 
271 In this matter, see supra Part IV. A. 
272 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 16(1), at 74. 
273 Covenant on Civil Rights, supra note 2, art. 23(4), 999 U.N.T.S. at 179. 
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nant.”274 Another convention that also provides for equality of rights 
between the sexes within the context of the institution of marriage is 
the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. 
Article 16(1) provides as follows: 
 States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to elimi-
nate discrimination against women in all matters relating to 
marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, 
on a basis of equality of men and women: 
 The same right to enter into marriage; 
 The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into 
marriage only with their free and full consent; 
 The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and 
at its dissolution; 
 (d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irre-
spective of their marital status, in matters relating to their 
children; in all cases the interests of the children shall be 
paramount; 
 (e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on 
the number and spacing of their children and to have access 
to the information, education and means to enable them to 
exercise these rights; 
 (f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard to 
guardianship, wardship, trusteeship and adoption of chil-
dren, or similar institutions where these concepts exist in na-
tional legislation; in all cases the interests of the children 
shall be paramount; 
 (g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, includ-
ing the right to choose a family name, a profession and an 
occupation; 
 (h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the 
ownership, acquisition, management, administration, en-
joyment and disposition of property, whether free of charge 
or for a valuable consideration.275
 In addition to the explicit prohibition of discrimination between 
the sexes within the context of marriage, these three instruments also 
provide for the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of national 
                                                                                                                      
274 Covenant on Social Rights, supra note 2, arts. 3, 2(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5, 5. 
275 For a discussion of this provision, including the reservations of Israel, see infra, Part 
IV. D. 
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origin, race, and religion. Article 2(2) of the Covenant on Social 
Rights speciªes an open list of prohibitions against discrimination 
(“or other status”),276 Articles 2(1) and 26 of the Covenant on Civil 
Rights lay down a prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race, 
religion, national origin “or other status,”277 and Article 16(1) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that the right to marry 
shall not be limited “due to race, nationality or religion.”278
 These conventions do not deªne the nature of the marriage 
ceremony that is the subject of the right or the nature of the law that 
applies to marriage. In fact, in the wording of the international con-
ventions, we do not ªnd an explicit requirement for the implementa-
tion of civil marriage.279 Nevertheless, since these conventions forbid 
discrimination on the basis of sex, national origin, race, and religion 
in the implementation of the right to marriage, they should be inter-
preted as indirectly forbidding the exclusive application of religious 
law in matters of marriage and divorce. The General Comment of the 
Committee on Human Rights of 1990 expressly notes that “the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion implies that the legis-
lation of each State should provide for the possibility of both religious 
and civil marriages.”280 If that is the case, then the implementation of 
the provisions of the conventions necessitates the grant of a right to 
marriage without discrimination of any kind whatsoever.281 Therefore, 
the word “marriage” in the aforesaid conventions should be inter-
preted as referring to civil marriage. 
D. The Laws of Marriage and Divorce in Israel in View of International Law 
 The laws of marriage and divorce in Israel are incompatible with 
the fundamental human right to marry and to establish a family as rec-
                                                                                                                      
276 Covenant on Social Rights, supra note 2, art. 2(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5. 
277 Covenant on Civil Rights, supra note 2, arts. 2(1), 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173, 179. 
278 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 16(1), at 74. 
279 See Covenant on Social Rights, supra note 2, art. 2(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5; Covenant 
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281 See Marsha A. Freeman, The Human Rights of Women in the Family: Issues and Recommen-
dations for Implementation of the Women’s Convention, in Women’s Rights, Human Rights: In-
ternational Feminist Perspectives 149, 157 ( Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995). 
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law, without any connection to their religion, origin or race. Id. 
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ognized and accepted in the international sphere.282 Israeli law in mat-
ters of marriage and divorce, therefore, gravely harms the possibility for 
many people to realize fully their right to family life. This law leads to 
an inequality in the legal status of men and women, and imposes arbi-
trary restrictions on various groups in the population, discriminating 
against them on the basis of religion, national origin, and race. 
 The ways in which Israel infringes on the right to marriage by 
applying religious law are as follows: (1) negation of the right to 
marry for persons without a religion and members of unrecognized 
religious communities; (2) restriction of the possibility for mixed 
marriages between spouses of different religions;(3) restriction of the 
right to marry for persons disqualiªed for religious marriage; and (4) 
a violation of the equality between women and men within the con-
text of the institution of marriage. 
 The questions, therefore are, ªrst, to what degree is Israel in 
breach of the provisions of Article 16(1) of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, Articles 2(1) and 26 of the Covenant on Civil 
Rights, and Article 2(2) of the Covenant on Social Rights, to the ex-
tent that those provisions concern the prohibition against discrimina-
tion on the basis of national origin, race, and religion. And, second, 
to what degree is Israel in breach of the provisions of Article 16(1) of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 23(4) of the Cove-
nant on Civil Rights, Articles 2(2) and 3 of the Covenant on Social 
Rights, and Article 16(1) of the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, to the extent that those provisions 
concern the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex. It 
has been argued that Israel is in breach of Article 16 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights only in those cases where the right to 
marry has been completely denied to certain groups (persons without 
a religion and members of unrecognized religious communities).283 It 
has been claimed that the prohibition of discrimination should only 
attach to the subjects of the right—men and women—and not to the 
right itself.284 This interpretation is unacceptable, since it is incom-
patible with the wording of this provision and is liable to render it 
meaningless.285 As for Article 16(1) of the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of Discrimination against Women and Article 23 of the Cove-
                                                                                                                      
282 See Rubinstein, supra note 217, at 442 n.20. 
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284 See id. 
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nant on Civil Rights, Israel has given notice that it has reservations 
regarding these provisions, insofar as they are incompatible with the 
personal law binding upon the religious communities in Israel.286 
These reservations run contrary to the subject matter and purpose of 
these instruments—the prevention of discrimination against women, 
even under the laws of personal status.287 Undoubtedly, in view of the 
aforesaid international instruments, any kind of discrimination in 
granting the right to marriage—on the basis of race, national origin, 
ethnicity, religion, and sex—is a breach of Israel’s international com-
mitments. Therefore, it is not only the denial of the right to certain 
groups that constitutes a breach of the conventions that Israel has 
signed, but also the restriction for religious reasons, like the arrange-
ments that discriminate against women in the context of the institu-
tion of marriage—all of these constitute illegitimate discrimination 
that gravely harm the individual’s right to marry.288 The aforesaid in-
ternational instruments also provide for the right of equality between 
the spouses, not only in the creation of the marriage, but also in its 
dissolution. Therefore, the right to marry freely (free from the restric-
tions of religious law or, in other words, the right to civil marriage) 
also includes the right to civil divorce. 
 Israel is in breach of both the prohibition against discrimination 
between men and women, as well as prohibitions against discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, national origin, and religion, during all 
                                                                                                                      
286 See L.S., supra note 253. 
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vention, is infringed. See Rubinstein, supra note 217, at 443. 
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three stages of marriage: its creation, its content, and its dissolution. 
The right to marriage under international law should be interpreted 
as referring to the implementation of civil marriage. It is true that 
many countries that have signed these conventions recognize mar-
riages that have been performed according to religious law. Except 
for Israel, however, all Western nations that have signed the conven-
tions grant such recognition alongside the option of civil marriage. 
Moreover, the law that governs in these countries, both during the 
marriage and for the purpose of its dissolution, is the civil law. Ac-
cordingly, there is nothing illegitimate in the recognition of religious 
marriage as an additional way to form the marital bond, provided that 
the state also grants its citizens the right to civil marriage. 
 Ostensibly, it could be argued that the right to civil marriage, like 
other rights enunciated in the Covenant on Social Rights, is not an ab-
solute but, rather, a relative right, since Article 4 provides that the 
member states are entitled to limit the rights enunciated therein by law 
“in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and 
solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic 
society.”289 Therefore, prima facie, Israel could claim that, by implement-
ing marriage according to religious law, it is limiting the right to civil 
marriage lawfully and in accordance with the Covenant.290 Such a claim 
would be untenable for several reasons. First, the relativity of the rights 
is expressed in their cost, and the principle of equality between the 
sexes is not diminished because of the relativity of the right. The re-
sponsibility of the member states to implement the rights is dependent 
on the amount of resources at their disposal,291which has no relevance 
concerning the nature of marriage. Second, the Committee for the 
Implementation of the Covenant on Social Rights has interpreted Arti-
cle 4 very narrowly.292 Third, even if such a claim was accepted, then 
the right to civil marriage arises from several other conventions that 
Israel has signed (the Covenant on Civil Rights and the Convention on 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women).293
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 Being well aware of the cultural, economic, and social differences 
between various nations, both the Covenant on Social Rights and the 
Covenant on Civil Rights set forth minimum standards of respect for 
human rights binding upon the states that have signed these conven-
tions.294 International law, therefore, tries to achieve a consensus in re-
gard to such a minimum standard for the recognition of basic social 
and civil rights, as reºected in the conventions regulating these mat-
ters.295 These conventions specify the lowest threshold for the degree of 
protection required of the states in the socio-political realm. Of course, 
the member states should aspire to the widest possible protection in 
these areas, but the states are not entitled to settle for less protection 
than that speciªed in the conventions. The lowest threshold, or the 
“minimum core,”296 of the right to family life is the right to marry 
freely, and, if we interpret “marriage” as “civil marriage,” then a state 
that does not grant its citizens the freedom to marry in a civil ceremony 
is in breach of the provisions of the Covenant on Civil Rights and the 
Covenant on Social Rights, as well as the provisions of the Convention 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. As to the pace 
and time for implementing the rights enunciated in the conventions, it 
is customary to differentiate between the Covenant on Civil Rights and 
the Covenant on Social Rights, since the former imposes obligations on 
the state that must be fulªlled immediately, while the latter sets stan-
dards that the state must aspire to realize, and where for some of the 
rights—those rights the implementation of which entails an investment 
of resources—the pace of implementation may be progressive.297 Nev-
ertheless, where it is possible to grant the right without a need for re-
sources—even when it is enunciated in the Covenant on Social 
                                                                                                                      
however, they are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of “colour, race, sex, lan-
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Rights—it must be granted immediately.298 Various aspects of the right 
to family life require the allocation of resources, such as the right of the 
family to social security and means of subsistence. Others, such as the 
right to be a parent (in its negative sense), do not impose any eco-
nomic burden on the state. As stated, the right to marriage is both a 
civil and a social right, and a change in its manner of implementation 
(replacing religious marriage with civil marriage, or introducing civil 
marriage alongside religious marriage) does not necessitate an invest-
ment of resources. Accordingly, for this right, there is no reason to ap-
ply the progressive principle speciªed by the Covenant on Social 
Rights, and it should be dealt with as mandated by the Covenant on 
Civil Rights, by the absolute and immediate adoption of the measures 
necessary for its implementation. 
 A different question is whether there is a need for a legislative 
reform, or whether an Israeli court has the authority to invalidate the 
current arrangement regarding matters of marriage and divorce. First 
of all, the right to marry freely in Israel should be recognized as a part 
of the right to “human dignity and liberty” enshrined in the Basic Law 
of the same name. In the words of Professor Rubinstein: “[f]rom the 
perspective of the values of the state as a democratic country, it is 
hard to see what proper purpose is served by forcing the Jewish citi-
zens of the state to be subject to Jewish Law in matters of marriage 
and divorce.”299 Nevertheless, in this context, it is not necessary to 
resolve the conºict between the values of Israel as a democratic coun-
try and its values as a Jewish state, since the “validity of laws” provision 
in the Basic Law precludes Section 1 of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdic-
tion Law from being declared unconstitutional.300 Moreover, on more 
than one occasion, the Supreme Court has ruled that the solution of 
the problem of the right to marriage in Israel is out of its hands: 
It is obvious to anyone who follows the Knesset’s work and 
the positions of the various political parties that this issue is a 
major bone of contention among the Israeli public, and that 
there has not yet been a decision, with proper legal form, to 
introduce civil marriage. And who are we, as judges ordered 
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Comment 3, supra note 53; Shany, supra note 291. 
299 Rubinstein & Medina, supra note 240, at 991. 
300 See The Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 1953, 7 L.S.I. 
139, § 1. 
2005] Family Life, Civil Marriage & International Law 145 
to distance ourselves from all political debate and argument, 
to take the place of the legislature and to decide on a ques-
tion that divides the public?301
Furthermore: 
With all due respect to the struggle of the Petitioners and 
those groups that think like them regarding their right to 
marry in a non-religious context, their claim should be ad-
dressed to the proper [authority]—the legislature. There is 
no solution for their problem other than by means of civil 
marriage performed by the state without any consideration 
for the religious afªliation (or lack thereof) of the parties. 
The courts should not be asked to resolve this problem.302
In Efrat, Justice Barak ruled that: 
In Israeli society, there is no consensus on this issue, and the 
Court cannot be expected to decide pronouncedly one way 
or the other. The Court crystallizes public policy as it is re-
ºected, from its own objective perspective. Unequivocal de-
cisions in this sensitive matter can only come from non-
judicial entities. There are those who believe that the solu-
tion to the problem is the introduction of civil marriage . . . 
others believe that the solution is to be found in the ªeld of 
Jewish law itself . . . in any event, the Court itself cannot and 
should not resolve the basic problem. The Court should not 
be expected to order the introduction of civil marriage, and 
the Court has consistently refused to do so.303
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 In view of these rulings, it seems that the demand for the introduc-
tion of civil marriage in Israel should be directed at the legislature.304 It 
is highly doubtful, however, that, in the current Israeli political frame-
work, the legislature will be inclined to provide a comprehensive ar-
rangement for civil marriage. At present, the apparent trend is a com-
promise whereby a quasi-marriage institution (a partnership registry) 
will be introduced that will only solve the problem of persons dis-
qualiªed from religious marriage in Israel.305
Conclusion 
 International law recognizes the right to family life as a fundamen-
tal right of paramount importance. The courts in Israel have also rec-
ognized the right to family life as a fundamental constitutional right. 
Nevertheless, as we have seen, in various contexts, proper weight has 
not been given to this basic right. The absence of a clear, standard 
deªnition for the “family” and the exclusion of “alternative” family 
bonds leads to an infringement of the rights of many who, in practice, 
conduct a family life. Thus, for instance, only married heterosexual 
couples are entitled to adopt a foreign child together and only a man 
and a woman who are a couple are entitled to use the services of a sur-
rogate mother. As a result, the right to parenthood of unmarried cou-
ples (or couples who are not reputed spouses), including that of same-
sex couples, is limited. Moreover, there is clearly a disparity in the 
manner of implementation of the right to family life between Jewish 
Israeli citizens, on the one hand, and Arab Israeli citizens and Arab 
residents of the Occupied Territories, on the other. This discrimination 
is primarily expressed in regard to the right to immigrate to Israel 
based on family ties and the right of residents of the Occupied Territo-
ries to family uniªcation. 
 The most severe limitation on the right to family life within the 
borders of Israel relates to the lack of an option to marry in a civil 
ceremony. While international law recognizes the imposition of cer-
tain limitations on the freedom to marry (the age for marriage and 
prohibitions regarding incest and bigamy), the additional limitations 
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on the right to marry, imposed by Israeli law, constitute a breach of 
Israel’s international commitments. 
 Making the right to marriage conditional on compliance with the 
requirements of a substantive religious law that does not recognize 
the marriages of persons without a religion, marriages between mem-
bers of different religious communities, and even certain cases of 
marriage between members of the same religion, and which further 
lays down precepts that discriminate against women, is undoubtedly a 
violation of the international conventions and instruments discussed 
in this article. The only way to ensure equality within the family con-
text in Israel, and by so doing to guarantee the right of every person 
to a marriage free from the fetters of religious law, is by legislative re-
form that would permit civil marriage. The proper arrangement 
would specify civil law as the exclusive substantive law applying in mat-
ters of marriage and divorce, and would allow a choice between a civil 
marriage ceremony and a religious marriage ceremony. 
